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South-South Development Cooperation is a longstanding practice that has 
undergone many unprecedented changes since the dawn of the twenty-first century.  
However, following the first decade of the century, some key players in development 
cooperation seem to have reduced their efforts to promote South-South Development 
Cooperation, notably Brazil. Under president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s ambitious 
strategy of international prominence was most eminent within the framework of 
development cooperation, wherein the African continent occupied a central place. Such 
efforts, however, lost impetus under the subsequent presidencies of Dilma Rousseff 
(2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018).  
This thesis reflects upon the changes in Brazil’s foreign policy dispositions after 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2011-2018) and how it affected the country’s South-South 
Development Cooperation initiatives. By looking at the case of Mozambique, it seeks to 
understand such changes vis-à-vis the shifting nature of both the international system 
and, most importantly, the domestic setting of Brazil. While the government of Luiz Inácio 
Lula da Silva laid the foundations of Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation 
agenda (i.e. an instrument for the pursuit of the country’s global ambitions and a 
reflection of the national approach to development), these foundations were undermined 
during the subsequent governments, led by constraining international circumstances and 
the dismantling of the state-led developmental model advanced by the Workers’ Party. 
The undermining of South- South Development Cooperation’s foundations occurred 
through two major mechanisms. Firstly, foreign policy goals were re-defined in economic 
terms, and so was South-South Development Cooperation. The political goals that 
underpinned Brazil’s reformist ambitions lost space once the latter were gradually 
abandoned under Dilma Rousseff and completely discarded under Michel Temer. 
Secondly, South-South Development Cooperation both reflected and fed the model of 
state-led development adopted by the government of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Once this 
model was delegitimised and eventually dismantled, the South-South Development 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
1.1.  Background 
Although South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) is a longstanding 
practice1, the new millennium has witnessed an intensification of such practices among 
countries in the Global South2. More favourable systemic circumstances, particularly 
driven by the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, tilted the distribution of power 
towards the developing world. In this context, the rise of countries from the South as key 
players on the international stage fostered the resurgence of South-South Development 
Cooperation. Previously classified as recipients of international aid, several emerging 
countries are now also at the opposite end of development assistance. For these 
countries, SSDC emerges as not only a means to bolster their national development, but 
also as a way of increasing their international presence and influence. However, some 
key players in international development cooperation have recently demonstrated a 
decreasing interest in promoting these practices - notably Brazil.  
  Under the presidency of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), popularly known 
simply as Lula, Brazil stood out as one of the major actors of South-South Development 
Cooperation. Lula placed the country’s relations with the Global South at the centre of 
Brazil’s foreign policy agenda, considerably increasing development cooperation 
practices with its southern partners (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683). Needless to 
say, Lula’s agenda was significantly shaped by the positive macroeconomic and political 
circumstances experienced in the domestic domain, expressed in the internationally-
acclaimed domestic initiatives aimed at fighting hunger, poverty and inequality. While 
lifting millions of Brazilians out of poverty, Lula reinvigorated Brazil’s international 
relations and sought to advance a positive image of the country abroad. Brazil, in 
President Lula’s eye, should be understood as a successful story worth emulating and a 
credible leader of the developing world. As argued by Cunha (2016:10), Lula’s foreign 
 
1 The Bandung Conference of 1955, in Indonesia, is considered “a milestone in the formation of 
SSC as a global political movement” (Gray & Gills, 2015:557). The meeting gathered African and 
Asian countries around the quest for the end of colonialism, imperialism and underdevelopment 
in the Third World. Among several other established goals was the commitment with the 
promotion of political, economic and cultural cooperation among those countries (Prashad, 
2007:32) 
2 Dados & Connell (2012:12) argue that “the North-South language provided an alternative to the 
concept of ‘globalization’, contesting the belief in a growing homogenization of cultures and 
societies. As such, “North-South terminology, […] like core-periphery, arose from an allegorical 
application of categories to name patterns of wealth, privilege, and development across broad 
regions. The term Global South functions as more than a metaphor for underdevelopment. It 
references an entire history of colonialism, neo-imperialism, and differential economic and social 
change through which large inequalities in living standards, life expectancy, and access to 




policy was an essential part of the national development project. Besides favourable 
circumstances, some scholars will argue that Brazil’s disposition to engage in South-
South Development Cooperation projects during Lula’s two administrations (2003-2010) 
was, to a certain extent, personified in the image of the head of state, his personality and 
foreign policy ambitions (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:686).  
Brazil’s desire to develop a more active role within the emerging Global South is 
best illustrated by the country’s deepened relations with Africa, in particular with 
Lusophone African countries such as Mozambique, whose historical, racial and socio-
cultural proximity to Brazil set the stage for strengthened cooperation between the two 
countries in the new century (de Castro, 2013:3). 
 After the Lula years, however, Brazilian disposition to engage in SSDC, in 
particular with the African continent, has been challenged. In 2011, Lula da Silva was 
succeeded by his party fellow, Dilma Rousseff, who would supposedly provide continuity 
to her predecessor’s mandate of strengthening relations with Africa and exert little impact 
on the country’s involvement in SSDC. However, Rousseff and her foreign affairs team 
soon signalled possible shifts in the focus and rhetoric of the country’s foreign policy, 
which will be observed later. 
  The low profile international agenda carried out under Rousseff was, in part, 
motivated by as less favourable international economy caused by the 2007-2008 
economic clash and the decrease in commodity prices, which affected the country’s 
ability to keep up with the previous pace of economic growth. Domestically, this resulted 
in the decline of Brazil’s once successful developmental project, which was aggravated 
by corruption scandals involving the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT - Workers Party), 
leading to an unprecedented political and legitimacy crisis involving the ruling party. 
Consequently, urgent matters at the national level reduced the president’s ability to keep 
the ambitious international agenda initiated by Lula. This, in turn, compromised the 
country’s relationship with Africa, which moved away from the solidarity3 narrative 
towards a more pragmatic, results-orientated tone where commercial interests would 
play a central role (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:689).  
 Although Rousseff’s administration had already shown a decreasing interest in 
maintaining the SSDC initiatives initiated by Lula da Silva, it was under Michel Temer 
(2016-2018) that changes in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation were even more 
significant. Temer had been Rousseff’s vice president, and assumed office following the 
 
3 The definition of solidarity, for this thesis, was borrowed from Muhr (2016:633), as  “the 
commitment to mutual support and joint efforts to achieve sustainable and integral human 
development, and the appropriate care of countries’ emergent needs, within the possibilities and 




impeachment of Rousseff in Agust 2016. Temer’s international agenda sought to re-align 
Brazil’s foreign policy with its “traditional partners” of the West, particularly the United 
States and Europe (Lima, Bragatti & Borges, 2017:12), causing Brazil’s development 
cooperation, in particular with Africa, to lose much of its impetus. The pragmatic tone 
adopted by Temer loosened the cooperation ties with the continent, transforming the 
African cooperation agenda into one driven by economic interest. 
  Amidst Brazil’s vast and complex bureaucratic apparatus, the Brazilian Ministry 
of Foreign Relations (Ministério das Relações Exteriores - MRE, or Itamaraty) has 
always been studied as a successful example of bureaucratic institution whose insulation 
from the political disturbances has enabled continuity and consistency in Brazil’s foreign 
policy direction. However, different depths of involvement in SSDC practices under 
different administrations is evidence of a more complex group of factors playing a role in 
Brazil’s foreign policy orientation and, particularly, its disposition towards SSDC 
practices. 
 Although Brazil’s use of SSDC as a foreign policy tool could be examined against 
its relationship with various different countries – ranging from Latin America to Asia – 
Mozambique was chosen as a case study for this research for two main reasons. Firstly, 
Brazil’s relationship with its South American neighbours represent a more urgent matter 
in the country’s foreign policy agenda, due to the fact that geographical proximity and 
the question of regional leadership have a direct impact on Brazil’s strategic economic 
policies and national security. Besides, the existence of economic frameworks such as 
Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the Union of South American Nations 
(Unasur) makes the establishment and deepening of ties an institutionalised demand 
that cannot simply be disposed of. 
Secondly, the central place occupied by Africa in the country’s foreign policy 
agenda during Lula’s administrations indicates that the country’s broader SSDC project 
– developed against the background of Brazil’s international ambitions – attempted to 
reach beyond matters of regional power-building or geographical proximity, which makes 
the African case more emblematic and more illustrative of the character of Brazilian 
South-South Development Cooperation.  
Within Africa, Lula’s government strengthened ties with several different nations, 
from the Portuguese-speaking countries to economic powers such as Nigeria and South 
Africa. However, Mozambique was the largest recipient of Brazilian cooperation 
initiatives, which range from the cancellation of debt to technical cooperation in areas 
such as agriculture, health, education and social development (Gonçalves, 2018:87). 
The significance of the Mozambican case also accounts for a bilateral relationship 




relationship with Brazil takes place against development initiatives such as the BRICS4 
and IBSA5. 
  
1.2. Problem statement 
South-South Development Cooperation, as carried out in the twenty-first century, 
is built upon the specificities of the existing international order, i.e. multipolar, as opposed 
to South-South Cooperation within the post-Second World War context. Therefore, in 
order to understand the sustainability and consistency of SSDC initiatives among 
countries from the South, it is imperative that multiple factors are taken into 
consideration. Above all, analysing changes in these countries’ approach towards 
international development entails the assessment of both systemic and domestic factors. 
To name but a few, the distribution of economic and political power within the global 
order, the political dynamics within each country’s borders and the international 
aspirations of their incumbent political leaders are examples of factors shaping the 
intensity and nature of SSDC. Regardless of the forces in place, the promotion of SSDC 
has been underpinned by the developing world’s beliefs and ambitions. 
By placing Mozambique at the centre of the country's cooperation for 
development agenda, Brazil promoted two main ideas: firstly, that cooperation for 
development could be fairer and more beneficial if carried out between countries with 
similar historical and socio-economic backgrounds, as well as similar domestic struggles, 
such as poverty and inequality. In other words, South-South Cooperation (SSC) should 
be pursued as an alternative to North-South Cooperation (NSC). Moreover, Brazil's 
active presence in the country, and in the continent in general, promoted the idea that 
stronger ties among Southern countries could give voice to those who have been hard 
done by an unequal international order. This idea underpins the reformist ambitions of 
Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula, carried out via its SSDC agenda. 
However, as illustrated by the Brazilian case, different countries' disposition to 
engage in development cooperation is subject to changes throughout time and is far from 
being consistent and stable. New global, regional, and national challenges will re-shape 
individual states' international standing and their ambitions. In the light of the 
aforementioned, for instance, a summit to discuss a new Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
(BAPA +40) took place in March 2019. It reiterated the importance of assessing progress 
and learning from past experiences of South-South Cooperation, as well as reformulating 
the plan of action created 40 years earlier. The key suggestion is that SSDC needs to 
 
4 A group comprised of Brasil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 




adapt to the new international context and the new United Nations (UN) 2030 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (United Nations, 2018:2). 
That is to say, although big initiatives such as the BRICS attempt to 
institutionalise SSC practices for future continuity and consistency, they do not provide 
a wider framework of action in which smaller countries could build stable and consistent 
partnerships with other Southern countries. Put differently, outside the domain of the 
“most powerful” among the Global South, countries such as Mozambique are held 
hostage by their Southern partners’ disposition to engage in development cooperation. 
In Brazil, the interplay between systemic and national political dynamics dictated 
the changes observed under Rousseff and Temer and reshaped the countries’ 
cooperation efforts towards Africa, particularly Mozambique. 
Under Rousseff, the technical cooperation budget (one of the SSDC modalities 
pursued by Brazil) was reduced by 25 per cent between 2012 (US$36.9 million) and 
2014 (US$ 27.8 million). Under Lula, 105 and 143 projects of technical cooperation with 
Africa were initiated in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Contrastingly, 87, 47, 12 and 11 
projects were initiated in 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively (Costa, 2015:15). As 
for the country’s cooperation with Mozambique, for instance, the Mozambique -Brazil-
Japan Cooperation Programme for the Agricultural Development of the Savannah of 
Mozambique project (ProSAVANA) - which consists of the biggest trilateral cooperation 
project that involves the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC),  Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the Mozambican Ministry of Afrigulture – faced financial 
constraints in 2015 that hindered the cooperation agreement and led to the paralysation 
of activities (Fingermann, 2015b:12).  Furthermore, as far as presidential diplomacy is 
concerned, Lula visited Mozambique five times during his two terms in office, whereas 
Rousseff only visited once, as did Temer while he was Rousseff’s vice president. 
Amidst several contributing factors for this inconsistency, major international 
shocks (e.g. the global financial crisis) and how they were perceived and responded to 
at home cannot be overlooked, especially in twenty-first century Brazil. Recently, the rise 
to power of conservative leader Jair Bolsonaro in 2019 is seen as the result of a renewed 
nationalist sentiment in Brazil. In terms of foreign policy, it represents a shift towards 
Brazil's “traditional” partners (i.e. the United States of America and Europe), the forging 
of stronger political ties with the Western nations and the subordination of the country's 
foreign policy agenda that was once independent and innovative. Nonetheless, changes 
in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation did not start with the election of Jair Bolsonaro, and 
can be traced back to the two governments that came before that. 
Despite clear changes in the conduction of Brazil’s SSDC policies in the 




this, particularly with regards to the driving forces behind the process of decline since 
Lula left office. Extensive research has been conducted to understand the transition from 
the governments of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to that of Lula. Due to its innovative 
character, Lula’s international agenda has long been a topic of interest for IR scholars, 
particularly concerning the president’s efforts to increase Brazil’s international presence 
and foster a multicultural approach to its international partners6. 
Similarly, several studies have dedicated to the topic of South-South Cooperation 
under Lula7, as well as Brazil’s growing presence in Africa during his administration8. 
Other studies have focused specifically on Mozambique9. All in all, most research 
pertaining to Brazil-Africa relations has aimed to understand the prominent role 
Mozambique - and Africa broadly -, came to play in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda, 
especially with regards to development cooperation efforts.  
However, existing literature on what came after the “golden years” of Brazil’s 
SSDC agenda is still scarce. Some studies scantily pointed out the significant decline of 
Brazil’s international presence after 201010, though not enough has been done to analyse 
individual cases. This study aims to plug this gap by looking at the complex web of factors 
determining Brazil’s international agenda, and driving its decline, particularly from the 
context of South-South Development Cooperation. More specifically, this paper uses the 
case of Brazil’s relations with Mozambique to test the hypothesis of retreat of Brazilian 
efforts towards development cooperation in Africa.  
As Chichava (2017) anticipated, the political and economic crises that arose in 
Brazil during Rousseff’s administrations signalled possible changes in the country’s 
relationship with Mozambique, that could compromise their efforts towards development 
cooperation. This research aims to investigate the extent of such changes, as well as 
what drove them. Besides being Brazil’s major cooperation partner in the continent, 
Mozambique also epitomises the essential features of Brazilian SSDC, as well as its 
driving factors. Moreover, presenting comprehensive and diverse projects, Brazil-
Mozambique relations also provide the best illustration of the limitations and the unstable 
nature of such relations. 
In short, the intention of this research is to identify the changes in Brazil’s foreign 
policy that impacted on the country’s approach towards South-South Development 
 
6 See Cason & Power, 2009; de Almeida, 2010; Trinkunas, 2014; Lima, Bragatti & Borges, 2017 
7 See Dalvergne & Farias, 2012; Abdenur & Neto, 2013; Bry, 2017a 
8 See Captain, 2010; Saraiva, 2010; Mapa, 2011b; da Costa Filho, 2018; Ridderbusch, 2018 
9 See de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013; Avelhan, 2015; Fingermann, 2015b; Alden, Chichava & 
Alves, 2017 
10 See de Castro, 2013; Cervo & Lessa, 2014; Cornetet, 2014; Albanus, 2015; Leite & Cavalcanti, 




Cooperation in the post-Lula years. To this end, this study will make apparent the internal 
and external forces behind this reconfiguration. As it is noted later in this thesis, the study 
case of Mozambique is a clear manifestation of changes in Brazil’s SSDC agenda after 
2011.   
 
1.3. Aims and significance 
 This thesis aims to investigate how changes in Brazil’s foreign policy disposition 
affected the country’s SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique after the Lula years, from 
2011 to 2018. The significance of this study is that it contributes to the understanding of 
SSDC as both a function and instrument of foreign policy, therefore constantly being 
shaped by both domestic and international constraints experienced by countries from the 
South in different periods of time.  
 There seems to be a consensus by scholars that the post-Lula agenda towards 
Africa, up until 2018, can be characterised by continuity with less intensity (Albanus, 
2015). Though many have written about Africa’s place in Brazilian foreign policy after 
Lula’s administrations, very few studies have attempted to look at country-specific cases 
to illustrate the scope of said changes.  The determinants, extent and consequences of 
such changes also reflect the nuanced character of Brazil’s relationship with its African 
counterparts.  
Beyond that, individual case studies can provide some important insights into the 
broader dynamics of South-South development cooperation. For countries such as 
Mozambique, that have not achieved the status of “emerging powers” that others such 
as China, India and Brazil have, this is of utmost importance. Their development 
cooperation partners need to be better understood in terms of their motivations, the 
institutional setting of their initiatives and, as advanced in this study, how their 
cooperation agenda is informed by an amalgamation of domestic and international 
forces. 
Against the aforementioned backdrop, the different approaches to SSDC 
observed in the three administrations to be studied in this thesis – Lula, Rousseff and 
Temer – can be better understood by looking at specific partnerships and how these 
have been altered throughout time. The relevance of this study lies on this exact point. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of foreign policy studies to contribute towards broader 
international relations analysis, the fragility and sustainability of development 
cooperation amongst the South reflect the several facets of this agenda. 
One of Brazil’s most important partners in the African continent, Mozambique 
occupies a significant place within the country’s SSDC agenda. What is still to be 




affected Brazil’s cooperation for development with its largest and most emblematic 
African partner. This can only be achieved through a thorough study of the factors that 
shaped these changes. Thus, this paper seeks to contribute, in the first place, to the 
literature on Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation practices in Mozambique 
and the African continent as a whole. More broadly, it aims to elucidate the subjection of 
South-South Development Cooperation to the national and international contexts. In 
essence, this study is driven by the belief that, for the motivations behind countries’ 
engagement in SSDC to be fully understood, it is not enough to understand the periods 
characterised by its expansion. Moments of decline need to be as deeply analysed as 
those of expansion and prosperity, as they offer a richer understanding of SSDC’s 
sustainability and future prospects. 
To this end, this thesis will fully explore the Brazil-Mozambique case by focusing 
on the South-South Development Cooperation agenda and initiatives within the time 
frame proposed. The paper will take Lula years as the point of departure, in order to 
gauge the reverberations of the retreat of development cooperation under Rousseff and 
Temer. 
 
1.4. Research Question 
In view of the goals established above, this thesis will be guided by the following 
research question:  
How did changes in Brazil’s foreign policy disposition affect South-South 
Development Cooperation initiatives towards Mozambique after Lula’s administrations? 
 
Moreover, this study will be supplemented by the following question:  




Against the backdrop of the aforementioned research question, this thesis argues 
that the jettisoning of South-South Development Cooperation as an integral feature of 
Brazil’s foreign policy towards Mozambique after Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva left office was 
due to global economic and domestic political turbulences that propelled the waning and 
eventual erosion of focus under the administrations of Dilma Rousseff and Michel Temer, 
respectively. Under Lula, Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation agenda was 
informed by the country’s leadership ambitions on the global stage. At the same time, 
this agenda also reflected model of development that had been adopted by the 




significant turn, which changed Brazil’s international presence from one of protagonist to 
one of timid conductor of its international agenda. This, in turn, compromised Brazil’s 
SSDC initiatives towards Africa, particularly Mozambique. These changes were dictated 
by both international and national factors. Internationally, a less favourable global 
economy for Brazilian commodities moved the country’s foreign policy orientation 
towards the pursuit of economic benefits, intensified by the quest for the return of the 
investments previously made in Mozambique. Domestically, crises in the economic and 
political domains affected the two administrations’ ability to provide continuity to the 
significantly costly SSDC project initiated by Lula. This, coupled with corruption scandals 
affecting both the Brazilian government and Mozambican officials, had direct impact on 
SSDC initiatives between the two countries.  
 
1.6. Conceptualising South-South Development Cooperation 
As per Emma Mawdsley, South-South Cooperation is as “a term that is 
capacious, variegated and flexible”. Ranging from “market-driven activities to the transfer 
of official resources for genuinely humanitarian purposes” (Fues, 2013:2), the concept is 
used to refer to a variety of objectives, actors (state and non-state) and modalities. That 
said, “very broadly, it refers to the transfer and exchange of resources, technology and 
knowledge, set within claims to shared colonial and post-colonial experiences and 
identities, and anchored within a wider framework of promoting the collective strength 
and development of the global South” (Mawdsley, 2019:259).  
Standing as an alternative to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development's (OECD) Official Development Assistance (ODA) , South-South 
Cooperation is promoted amongst developing countries and underpinned by principles 
that have been advocated for at various different moments in history, i.e. solidarity, 
horizontality, mutual-benefits and non-interference in domestic affairs (de Renzio & 
Seifert, 2014:1861). The historical background behind the formulation of these principles 
will be outlined in the next section. 
Informed by shared experiences and similar concerns about national 
development, SSC practices are also premised on demand-driven development 
cooperation and respect for the singularities and characteristics of the recipient country 
(South Centre, 2009:1). With regards to its modalities, “SSC is broadly understood as 
the exchange of resources, technology, skills and technical know-how among countries 
of the South, as well as the building of coalitions to promote social, economic, cultural, 
political and scientific development and to transform global governance power balance.” 




For the purpose of this thesis, and given the broadness of SSC, the term South-
South Development Cooperation (SSDC) was adopted over the term South-South 
Cooperation (SSC). Once again, there is no common ground among scholars over the 
differences between both concepts and they are often used interchangeably. In this 
paper, however, it is understood that SSC underpins a broader range of cooperation 
practices that are not necessarily developmental, such as arms trading (Besharati et al, 
2015:12).  
On the other hand, South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) consists of 
transfer of sate funds that are exclusively directed towards development, mostly 
exercised on a bilateral basis (Fues, 2013:2). The different interpretations of 
“development” in different countries, as well as the lack of standardisation of South-South 
Development Cooperation practices universally, SSDC is usually subject to different 
understanding and goals (Gore, 2013:772).   
Nonetheless, the same demand-driven principle of SSC is extended to 
development cooperation practices amongst developing countries, which imply the 
participation of recipient countries as the evaluator of their own needs and priorities, upon 
which cooperation projects will be designed (Bry, 2017b:165; Fues, 2013:3). That being 
said, this mobilisation of national resources towards cooperation projects is also 
accompanied by efforts to align SSDC with domestic policies for development in the 
“donor” countries. State-funded practices coexist with other sources of finance, such as 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (Gore, 2013:771) and debt relief initiatives. 
All in all, South-South Development Cooperation can be defined as “an 
intersection between international development co-operation and SSC, comprehending 
the flows of technical co-operation, financial or in-kind donations and concessional loans 
among developing countries aimed at tackling primary development problems” 
(Besharati et al, 2015:11). Through the sharing of developmental practices and 
experiences, SSDC seeks to achieve a set of goals, as discussed by Gore (2013:771-
772): a) promotion of larger independence from the most advanced economies and 
“traditional donors”; b) reduction of extreme poverty and the provision of “a minimally 
adequate living standard globally by tackling specific human development deprivations” 
(Gore, 2013:772); c) provision of “global public goods”, such as national security, 
infectious disease control, and the promotion of environmental practices (Gore, 
2013:772). Furthermore, Gore also stressed SSDC’s aspirations towards the reform of 
the traditional global development landscape “so as it is more development-friendly” 
(Gore, 2013:771). 
 Finally yet importantly, most national cooperation agencies are located within the 




with the international agenda and its political ties (Bry, 2017b:167). While this is also the 
case within Brazil’s SSDC structure, several other domestic institutions take part in 
cooperation initiatives. Before outlining Brazil’s understanding of South-South 
Development Cooperation and the domestic setting that structure these initiatives, it is 
essential to attend to the evolution of South-South Cooperation as a political project over 
the past seven decades.  
 
1.6.1. The case for unity and cooperation 
 The idiosyncrasies of South-South Development Cooperation, as known in the 
twenty-first century, have been shaped by the existing economic and political context. 
That being said, the “spirit” behind development cooperation among the South11 can be 
traced back to the post-World War II movements of unity and non-alignment, inaugurated 
by the Bandung Conference of 195512. In the context of a bipolar world order in which 
two major powers, the United States of America (USA) and the Soviet Union (USSR), 
sought to expand their sphere of influence into the so-called “Third World”, the 
disadvantaged regions of the world continue to experience the consequences of colonial 
rule and extreme poverty.  
 
“Despite the promise of self-determination, universal ‘well-being’, ‘equal rights’ and 
‘economic and social progress and development’ contained in the United Nations Charter, 
living standards in ‘peripheral’ world regions in the early 1950s, as measured by per capita 
output, were on average only marginally better than they had been in 1750, while their 
relative share of world manufacturing (6.5 per cent) was five times lower than it had been 
in 1860 (36.6 per cent)” (Golub, 2013:1003) 
 
Against this background, the Bandung Conference gathered 29 countries from 
Africa and Asia in their quest for decolonisation, development, respect for human rights 
and self-determination, and world peace (Final Communiqué, 1955). Within the context 
of the Cold War, Bandung symbolised the birth of “Third World solidarity” (Lee, 2009:87) 
and unity in the fight against Western colonisation and rife underdevelopment in the two 
continents.  Among the goals established in Bandung, documented in its Final 
 
11 The idea of a “Global South” emerges within the context of the globalisation movement. Prior 
to that, terminologies such as the “Third World” and “periphery” were used to refer to the group 
of (politically and economically) marginalised countries outside Europe and North America (Dados 
& Connell, 2012:12-13). These countries share several characteristics, which include the socio-
economic consequences of a colonial past and endemic underdevelopment. 
12 Though Bandung symbolises the beginning of a new era of cooperation and unity, the 
Conference did not happen in a political vacuum. For more on the pre-Bandung context, see 
Assie-Lumumba, N. T. (2015). Behind and beyond Bandung: historical and forward-looking 




Communiqué, was cooperation for development in the economic, social, political and 
cultural domains. With regard to economic development, commitment to “mutual interest 
and respect for national sovereignty” (Final Communiqué, 2009) as well as technical 
cooperation expressed the collective desire to find an alternative to the Western-imposed 
model of development. This “Third World solidarity”, also called the “Bandung spirit” (Lee, 
2009:87), would pave the way for the rise of South-South Development Cooperation as 
an important apparatus in the geopolitics of the twenty-first century. In other words, as 
stated by Gray & Gills (2016:557), Bandung laid the foundations for the establishment of 
South-South Cooperation as a political movement. 
Still in the twentieth century, Bandung was followed by the institutionalisation of 
the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) in Belgrade in 1961 (Lee, 2009:87). Against the 
backdrop of the Cold War, the NAM embodied the Bandung ideas of non-interference 
and furthered the spirit of cooperation and solidarity among the Third World. Both 
Bandung and Belgrade asserted the developing world’s right to autonomously define 
their approach to development, and sought to minimise their dependence on the 
advanced economies of the North (Gray & Gills, 2016:558). 
This movement for autonomy and cooperation among the developing world 
continued with the creation of the Group Seventy-Seven (G77) at the first United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva in 1964 (UNCTAD, n.d.). The group 
sought to increase the influence of developing countries within the United Nations by 
improving the means for the articulation and negotiation of their interests. Concurrently, 
the group also aimed at promoting South-South Development Cooperation (G77, n.d.). 
In 1974, the G77 launched the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO), which called for a negotiated reform of the existing international 
order for purposes of redressing the historical legacies of colonialism and fostering social 
emancipation and economic development in the developing countries (Gray & Gills, 
2016:558; Golub, 2013:1004).  
In 1978, the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), endorsed by the United 
Nations, sought to formalise South-South Cooperation initiatives and promote the 
practice of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). The document 
is considered the first attempt to formally recognise the growing importance of developing 
countries in international practices of cooperation and development assistance. At the 
same time, BAPA reiterated the importance of maintaining technical assistance from 
traditional donors (de Renzio & Seifert, 2014:1862; Ferreira et al, 2016:2) 
 Among others, the meetings in Bandung, Belgrade, Geneva and Buenos Aires 
all paved the way for the re-emergence of South-South Cooperation in the twenty-first 




the 1980s and 1990s, as a result of debt and economic crises in great part of the 
developing world, the cooperation agenda re-emerges in the 2000s. The emerging 
economies of the South, in particular China, India and Brazil, acquired greater economic 
and political power and assumed new roles in the international development landscape. 
Therefore, South-South Cooperation, in the new century, built upon the zeitgeist of the 
1950s13 to challenge the Northern model of development aid (Amanor & Chichava, 
2016:13). 
 Since the post-war era until recently, members of the OECD-DAC coordinated 
and dominated the efforts towards international development, providing most of the 
resources for such purposes. As stated by Gore (2013:770), “there was a clear sense of 
what ODA was, and there was also a well-defined aid architecture through which three 
leading institutions—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD)—regulated and structured the practices of donors 
and recipients”. Northern-led development aid, in this context, is usually tied to 
conditionalities underpinned by a liberal ethos, i.e. the endorsement of free and open 
markets, deregulation, privatization and the promotion of democracy (Gore, 2013:774). 
Though significant to the development of poorer countries, the historical 
dependence on the resources by advanced economies spurred the emergence of 
various Global South initiatives seeking to challenge the dominance of Western aid and 
its limitations, as discussed before. For most of the developing world, the vertical, 
unequal and conditional approach to development assistance that characterises the 
majority of DAC’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) “still bore traces of nineteenth 
century colonialism, fostering a form of relative dependence” (Ferreira et al, 2016:2). In 
this context, the re-surfacing of South-South Cooperation in the new millennium depicts 
not only the changes in the global political economy, but also the need to challenge DAC-
related standards and practices in international development.  
 
1.6.2. What South-South Development Cooperation means for Brazil: Actors and 
Institutional Setting   
 Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation is underpinned by Article Four in 
the Federal Constitution, which states that “the Federal Republic of Brazil conducts its 
international relations [based on principles such as] cooperation between people for the 
 
13 Mawdsley (2019:261) provides a periodisation of South-South Cooperation as having three 
different phases: SSC 1.0 (1950-2000) or Third-Worldist phase; SSC 2.0 (2000-2015) or 
expansionist phase, characterised by the formation of relevant institutions such as the BRICS, 
IBSA and FOCAC; and SSC 3.0, an emerging phase where a more pragmatic and even 




progress of humanity” (MRE, 2018, n.d.). The different modalities of Brazilian 
cooperation for international development contemplate technical cooperation, education 
cooperation, scientific and technological cooperation, humanitarian cooperation and 
peacekeeping operation (Lima, 2017:15). Having over 100 partner countries, it seeks to 
collaborate towards social and economic development in areas such as agriculture, 
education, health, environment, national safety, professional training, food security and 
food safety and energy (MRE, 2018, n.d.). Within the scope of SSDC adopted in thesis, 
emphasis will be placed on Brazil’s technical cooperation, encompassing areas such as 
agriculture and health. 
 According to de la Fontaine and Seifert (2010:4), Brazilian South-South 
Cooperation agenda is shaped by five major domestic actors: A) Presidential diplomacy; 
B) Brazil’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (Ministério das Relações Exteriores – MRE), 
also called Itamaraty: the Ministry has historically held the monopoly of  foreign policy 
formulation, but this has changed steadily since democratisation. The Brazilian Agency 
for Cooperation (ABC) operates within the structure of Itamaraty. C) Apart from ABC, 
Brazilian SSC involves a number of other ministries and state agencies that have 
become key actors of international policies such as the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Education, the Ministry of Social Development, the Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa) and the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (Fiocruz) and so forth; D) 
Brazilian enterprises and E) Brazilian Non-Governmental Organisations (ONGs) 
The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) operated under the umbrella of Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and is responsible for coordinating the country’s development 
cooperation initiatives alongside multiple other actors involved in their execution, the 
majority of which are federal entities and ministries (Chichava et al, 2013:7). ABC’s 
conception of Brazilian SSDC is one of “an important instrument of foreign policy, which 
Brazil uses to ensure a positive and growing presence in countries and regions of primary 
interest” (Bry, 2017a:7). More broadly, within both the ABC and Itamaraty there is a 
shared understanding of the country’s motives behind its SSDC initiatives, which can be 
briefly resumed into five main points: a) SSDC is guided by the notion of multilateralism; 
b) cooperation is the means to safeguard Brazil’s international emergence; c) SSDC 
speaks to Brazil’s ambitions of reforming the United Nations Security Council by 
acquiring one of the permanent seats; d) SSDC as an instrument to reinforce the 
country’s anti-imperialist sentiment and disposition in the international scene; and e) 
SSDC’s aim to support developing countries’ economies speaks to Brazil’s interests in 






Although quantitative data on Brazil’s SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique will 
be presented to support the analysis, this study will adopt a qualitative approach to 
unpack the question. This choice was mainly guided by the lack of availability of 
quantitative data on the Temer government’s SSDC initiative. Moreover, this study is 
premised on the belief that a country’s South-South Development Cooperation initiatives 
cannot be measured in quantitative terms only. In Muhr’s (2016:635) words, “reciprocal 
benefits may be generated that cannot always be expressed in quantifiable monetary 
terms, such as with respect to experience, knowledge and cultural exchange, capacity 
building, diplomatic solidarity, human rights promotion, and the visibility and recognition 
of the South generally” (Muhr, 2016:635). In fact, the examination of non-quantitative 
data can offer better insights into the the use of SSDC as a foreign policy instrument, as 
well as what the determinants of different countries’ SSDC agenda are. 
For Williams (2007:67), qualitative research is used to decribe, explain, and 
interprete an array of collected data. As opposed to the deductive rationale behind 
quantitative approaches, qualitative research is guided by the use of an inductive 
rationale to respond to the questions proposed (Williams, 2007:67). Bennet & Elman 
(2007:171) stress that the contributions of qualitative methods to the study of complex 
phenomena in the discipline of International Relations explain the prominence this 
research approach within the field, particularly the use of case studies. In Creswell’s 
(2007:73) words, “case study research is a qualitative approach in which the investigator 
explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) over time, 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information (e.g., 
observations, interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports), and reports 
a case description and case-based themes. (Creswell, 2007:73)”. 
Therefore, the adoption of a case-study approach to investigate Brazil’s South-
South Development Cooperation agenda during the selected time frime will enhance the 
explanatory capacity of this research on the subject. In other words, by looking at the 
specificities of the Mozambican case, this study will achieve a better comprehension of 
Brazil’s approach to SSDC under Rousseff and Temer’s administrations (2011-2018).  
Finally, this study will make use of both primary (official governmental documents 
and reports, as well as speeches) and secondary sources (available academic literature, 
journal articles and books) in order to provide detailed information on the subject in 
question. 
    





1.8.1. State of literature on the causes of Brazil’s reduced international influence 
 Traditionally, the monopoly of Brazil’s foreign policy formulation is held by its 
Ministry of External Relations, or Itamaraty, which works alongside Brazilian presidents 
to decide on the country’s international agenda. Itamaraty is traditionally mandated to 
run independently and shielded from partisan politics, in order to achieve efficient levels 
of consistency, professionalism and continuity (Burges and Bastos, 2017:277). However, 
different interpretations of Brazil’s international role and what the priorities of its foreign 
policy should be surely impact on the way the country behaves under different 
governments. At the same time, different research done on the subject has adopted a 
variety of divergent theoretical points of departure, focusing on what they believe to be 
the important aspects of the analysis. In this context, a great variety of analyses have 
been carried out to explain the Brazil’s withdrawal from the active international agenda 
pursued under Lula, and a few of them deserve special attention. 
 Recent research, which analysed Brazilian foreign policy between 1990 and 2015 
and across five different administrations, has reasserted the importance of presidential 
authority. Presidents’ engagement above the minimal roles stipulated in the Constitution 
will exert significant influence on the country’s formulation of innovative foreign policy. 
While Lula’s innovative international agenda was shaped by the president’s active 
involvement in foreign affairs, Burges and Bastos (2017:278) argue that, contrary to her 
two predecessors, Rousseff was less engaged with the country’s foreign policy agenda. 
Faced with domestic political and economic crisis, Rousseff allowed the Itamaraty to 
work for itself, transforming the previously dynamic and innovative Brazilian foreign 
policy into a more inertial one (Burges and Bastos, 2017:287). 
 Similarly, by looking at the period between 2013 and 2016 and the transition 
between two presidents from the same political party Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(Workers’ Party), Mawdsley, Kim & Marcondes (2017:8) argue that Brazilian practices of 
development cooperation were personified as a “Lula agenda”, as a consequence of the 
president’s charisma and personal experience, a strategy that proved limited as of the 
transition to Rousseff’s administration. For the authors, the retreat experienced in the 
country’s SSDC practices were caused by a combination of changes in political 
leadership and domestic and international circumstances (Mawdsley, Kim & Marcondes, 
2017:10). Still on the president’s role, some researchers have attributed the inertial 
foreign policy, right after Lula, to Rousseff’s personality, appointed as one the causes for 
Brazil’s timid role in development cooperation. For Cornetet (2014:129), Lula and 
Rousseff differed in terms of their socioeconomic and educational background and their 
political experience; elements that certainly shaped their world views, political ambitions 




Brazil’s foreign policy configuration, several other international and domestic elements 
shape the scope of these leaders’ ambitions and actions, acting as key determinants of 
the international agenda. 
Nery (2017:262) goes beyond presidential leadership to analyse Brazil’s foreign 
policy formulation vis-à-vis the different views and interests that characterise domestic 
political coalitions, or the “internal power dynamics”. By looking at the country’s different 
levels of disposition to engage in cooperation practices with South American countries 
from Lula until Temer, Nery contributes to the idea that the Brazilian foreign policy 
agenda has become highly politicised, centred on the presidents themselves but also 
reflecting the internal power dispute between different political and ideological views 
under different administrations (Nery, 2017:261). According to the author, Lula and 
Rousseff found support in a political coalition that included representatives of both the 
national elite and the social movements, workers and labour unions, an arrangement 
that allowed for an international agenda characterised by autonomy and closer 
relationships with the Global South (Nery, 2017:253). This arrangement, however, was 
dismantled by the rise of conservative neo-liberal forces within the government, under 
Temer, that radically changed the country’s foreign policy orientation, moving away from 
its relationship with the South and towards the United States and Europe. 
  Commentators and foreign policy researchers find themselves on common 
ground when depicting Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy agenda as an imperfect 
continuation of that of her predecessor, Lula. Although significant events involving the 
emergence of the Global South took place during Rousseff’s tenure, such as the 
establishment of the New Development Bank with the other BRICS countries in 2014, 
much of the impetus is said to have been lost. Upon his inauguration in office, Rousseff’s 
Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota was asked whether Brazil would continue to pursue the 
same international agenda crafted by President Lula, to which he responded that 
continuation did not mean repetition and that new emphasis and nuances could be 
expected in the new government (MRE, 2011a). 
 For Cervo & Lessa (2014:149), Brazil’s reduced international presence between 
2011 and 2014 is a consequence of four main factors: a) poor communication between 
the government and segments of the society about the directions of Brazil’s international 
agenda; b) investors and entrepreneurs’ lack of trust in the government; c) absence of 
innovative ideas and strategies to boost foreign actors’ interest in the country; and d) 
loss of persuasive and productive capacity by the state in the public management 
sphere. 
 Marcondes & Mawdsley (2017:689), on the other hand, identify two main factors 




widened and deepened under Lula da Silva, they were not institutionalised so as to 
guarantee long-term sustainability. In other words, the authors believe that the creation 
of a legal framework within which South-South practices would be institutionalised, along 
with clearly defined bureaucratic roles would have allowed for consistency and continuity 
(Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:691). Furthermore, a weakening political support by the 
Congress and increasing scrutiny over allocation of resources and debt relief initiatives 
helped change the narrative towards a more “result-orientated” one, in which the capital 
previously invested, had to now benefit a struggling domestic economy (Marcondes & 
Mawdsley, 2017:692).  
 Alternatively, Malamud (2017:158) states that Brazil’s reduced international 
participation in the second decade of the century can be attributed to both changes in 
the international system, which became economically less favourable to Brazilian 
performance in global markets, and the structural consequences of an economic rise 
underpinned by de-industrialisation and increasing dependence on commodity prices, 
which compromised the country’s long-term economic growth and, therefore, its 
international presence.  
 
1.8.2. State of literature on the Mozambican case under Rousseff and Temer 
The relevance of the Mozambican case to understand Brazil-Africa relations in 
the broad scheme of SSDC lies within the fact that the Portuguese-speaking country was 
Africa’s largest recipient of Brazilian development cooperation during the course of Lula’s 
tenure. At the centre of the country’s African agenda, Mozambique received Brazilian 
SSDC initiatives in several areas, notably agriculture, health and education. The 
Brazilian government under Lula’s administration also cancelled 95 per cent of 
Mozambique’s debt with the country, a total of US$315 million (Gonçalves, 2018:87). 
Simultaneously, Lula was also committed to boosting the flow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) from Brazil to Mozambique by increasing the presence of Brazilian 
multinational companies such as Odebrecht (in the construction field) and Vale (in the 
mining field) in the country and enhancing trade relations with Brazil. 
 The Mozambican case has not been studied in depth when it comes to the two 
administrations that succeeded Lula, neither was the influence of Brazil’s economic and 
political environment on development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. Much of the 
focus is placed on the Brazilian private enterprises based in Mozambique and the 
corruption scandals involving such companies and the two PT governments. 
 For Chichava (2017:382), Rousseff assumed office in the midst of a political and 
economic crisis that was about to get worse. A contracting Gross Domestic Product 




involving both government officials and the private sector have all added up to the 
weakening of ties between Brazil and Africa, in particular Mozambique. Corruption 
scandals involved President Rousseff and former President Lula, as well as Brazilian 
construction companies, such as Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht, which were 
accused of paying bribes to Mozambican authorities in order to win contracts (Chichava, 
2017:388). Therefore, although Mozambique remained one of the largest recipients of 
the Brazilian development cooperation budget under the Rousseff and Temer 
governments, several projects were eithercancelled, affected by a lack of resources or 
postponed in light of the corruption accusations. All this damaged the reputation of 
Brazilian companies and development practices in the country. 
 According to Burges (2014), when interviewed about the perceived differences 
between Lula and Rousseff’s international engagement, Odebrecht officials based in 
Maputo stated that “where the Lula government worked hard to open doors and 
encourage Brazilian firms to move into Latin American and Sub-Saharan markets, Dilma 
[Rousseff] was […] very clear to executives in Maputo that her government was going to 
follow the corporate sector, and not lead it” (Burges, 2014). Rizzi and Schutz (2017:42) 
also observe that, although the Rousseff government maintained the Africa project in the 
country’s foreign policy agenda as inherited by Lula, this was done more “discretely, with 
fewer high-level relations with Mozambique” (Rizzi and Schutz, 2017:42). 
 
1.8.3. Gap identified in the literature 
Although there is general consensus among scholars that Brazil-Africa relations 
were never the same under Rousseff and Temer as they were under Lula, there is no in-
depth study of the relationship between changes in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation and 
the country’s South-South Development Cooperation practices towards Mozambique. 
Additionally, the reconfiguration of Brazil’s development cooperation with Mozambique 
has not been examined vis-à-vis the domestic and international forces at play during the 
governments of Rousseff and Temer. In fact, most of the research has focused on the 
African continent as a whole, with little research carried out on Rousseff’s agenda 
towards Mozambique and no research that attempted to do the same analysis for 
Temer’s two years in office. Therefore, understanding Brazil and Mozambique relations 
within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation after Lula left office is 
necessary in order to fill this literature gap. 
 
1.9. Limitations of study 
  This paper aims to investigate Brazil’s foreign policy during a specific period of 




in Mozambique. The specificity of this research is in itself limiting, but a few major 
limitations should be mentioned. Primarily, this paper examines Brazil-Mozambique 
relations from the Brazilian perspective only, not extending the analysis to the African 
country’s foreign policy agenda. Furthermore, the paper does not assess the results of 
development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique, being limited to the analysis of the 
determinants of Brazil’s SSDC approach. 
 
1.10. Chapter Outline 
Following this introductory chapter, this paper is divided into four other chapters. 
The second chapter sets the theoretical approach that will guide the research. After 
looking at mainstream theories of International Relations (IR), i.e. their assumptions, 
contributions and limitations, it elucidates the adoption of Neoclassical Realism as the 
theoretical point of departure. The third chapter looks at Brazil under the Lula 
government, i.e. its rise as an international development player, the formulation of the 
country’s South-South Development Cooperation agenda, as well as the domestic and 
global factors that informed it. Brazil’s SSDC initiatives in Mozambique between 2003-
2010 are then discussed, setting the tone for the following chapter. This part is crucial 
as it identifies the major forces driving Brazil’s international agenda, both nationally and 
nationally. In short, this part presents the context within which the following 
administrations will emerge, and identifies several aspects of Brazil’s SSDC that 
compromised its sustainability in the long-term, e.g. the involvement of the private sector 
and the personification of Brazil’s Africa agenda as a “Lula agenda” rather than a 
Brazilian one. 
The fourth chapter addresses the main subject of this study, which is the changes 
in Brazil’s approach towards South-South Development Cooperation experienced after 
the Lula government, i.e. during Rousseff and Temer’s administrations. These changes 
are examined in light of the broader reconfiguration of Brazil’s foreign policy during said 
period. To that end, the chapter looks at the main driving forces behind Rousseff and 
Temer’s cooperation agenda, touching on the domestic and the international 
environment. This will afford the author the chance to identify the major determinants of 
SSDC in the Brazilian case, which is crucrial to understand Brazil-Mozambique relations 
during said period. The chapter will then focus on the Brazilian development cooperation 
initiatives in Mozambique under Rousseff and Temer and identifies the differences in the 
nature and the intensity of such initiatives in comparison to the Lula government. 
 The fifh chapter concludes the study by presenting its main findings and reflecting 
upon the case study in question, i.e. Mozambique. At last, it makes a few considerations 








  As stated by Jules and Sá e Silva (2008:45), South-South Cooperation is an 
interdisciplinary phenomenon and, as such, it has been studied by different fields of the 
social sciences, such as education, comparative politics, international relations and 
development studies. In the absence of a general theory of South-South Cooperation or 
a general theoretical conception of states’ motivations behind these policies, any attempt 
to analyse such a topic, as well as its transformations throughout time, can be carried 
out through the lens of different theoretical points of departure. Within the realm of 
International Relations, wherein this thesis places itself, different theoretical approaches 
may disagree on several issues ranging from the objects of studies and levels of analysis 
to its actual investigative purposes as theories. 
However, regardless of how wide the field may be, a few major theories have 
dominated scholarly discussions about international politics. Neorealism and 
neoliberalism have remained at the forefront of foreign policy discourses since the end 
of the Second World War, but others such as constructivism and critical theories 
represent a challenge to their dominance. Additionally, self-acclaimed “theories of 
foreign policy”, such as neoclassical realism, emerge as an attempt to fill the analytical 
gap left by dominant perspectives when looking at individual states. For this reason, the 
applicability of each major International Relations (IR) theories is discussed in this 
chapter, though they do not exhaust all the sub-theories that can be found under the 
umbrella of realism, liberalism, constructivism and critical (or Marxist) theories.  
The discussion around the applicability of these theories to individual cases is 
one that occurs frequently among IR theorists, who carry divergent views on what 
aspects14 to include and what to exclude in the formulation of theories in the first place, 
as well as what the object of analysis should be (Burchill & Linklater, 2005:19). For 
instance, with the emergence of the “level of analysis” within the field of international 
politics (Singer, 1961; Putnam, 1988), mainstream theories began to be questioned on 
 
14 For instance, Liberal theories attack realism’s failure to acknowledge the importance of 
economic factors, such as interdependence, in determining the prospects of war and peace in 
world politics, an aspect often neglected by realists (Burchill, 2005:66). Moreover, liberalism will 
advocate the relevance of non-state actors and international institutions in shaping international 
politics (Burchill, 2005:82). With reference to constructivism, its proponents will challenge both 
realist and liberal theories by arguing that normative and ideational structures, such as identity 
and international norms, will determine states’ actions, yet are often overlooked by mainstream 




their explanatory capabilities. The idea advanced was that the domestic context of a 
country will exert more influence on its international behaviour than previously thought, 
generating the need to incorporate to the analysis the examination of national politics, 
institutional settings, leadership style, among others,  
For example, realist theorist Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, argues 
for the dominance of the third image, or the international system, in determining the 
occurrence of war or peace in international politics, though he argues that an 
understanding of the two other levels (individual and the state) is required (Waltz, 
2001:238). Later, when defending the applicability of realist theories to the analysis of 
individual states’ foreign policies, Waltz maintained that theories of international politics 
are doomed to underspecification like any other theory. That does not mean, according 
to him, that specific factors could not be added to the analysis when such theories are 
applied (Waltz, 2001:56). In other words, international politics theories may exclude unit-
level factors that are required in the analysis of individual cases because they are 
theories of international relations and not theories of foreign policy. As such, when 
international factors are more decisive than international ones in defining a states’ 
behaviour, theories of international politics need assistance (Waltz, 2001:57). 
Brazil’s emergence as a new superpower must surely be explained in relation to 
the opportunities found in the international stage. Still, this would not be enough. A set 
of characteristics emerging from the domestic arena shaped the kind of foreign policy 
pursued by Lula, i.e. political ideologies, the success of developmental initiatives 
implemented nationally, leadership style and the nature of the relationship between the 
government and other domestic (political and economic) actors. Similarly, the 
subsequent governments of Rousseff and Temer reacted to a combination of changes 
in the international and domestic domains, which will determine the objectives and the 
scope of their international agenda.  
In other words, opting for a purely systemic theoretical tool to fully analyse the 
Brazilian agenda towards Africa, most particularly Mozambique, would result in a too 
simplistic conclusion that would ignore the unit-level dynamics influencing the changes 
in the country’s foreign policy. In the same vein, national factors alone cannot account 
for the combination of circumstances involved in Brazil’s rise and fall as key actor of 
South-South Development Cooperation, such as changes in the global economy. 
Therefore, Brazil’s development cooperation with a major African partner, Mozambique, 
must be carefully studied in order to cover all the important determinants of this agenda. 





After discussing the applicability of dominant IR theories to this individual case, 
this chapter will argue that, despite the relevant contributions of each theory to the 
broader understanding of Brazil’s international relations, they were deemed incomplete 
and less predisposed to offer a thorough explanation of the turn of events. Choosing 
between one of these theoretical frameworks would entail leaving out important internal 
and external factors that affected Brazil’s disposition towards South-South Development 
Cooperation practices from the Lula years until Temer’s term in office, particularly in 
Mozambique.  
  Therefore, Neoclassical Realism was chosen as the most appropriate theoretical 
framework for the purposes of this chapter in order to grasp the amalgamation of factors 
involved in Brazil’s changing orientation towards the use of South-South Development 
Cooperation initiatives as an instrument of foreign policy. A further discussion outlining 
the superiority of the neoclassical approach for the purposes of this study, as well as its 
specificities, will be touched upon later in this section. Similarly, the inappropriateness of 
the other theories for this study will also be examined. To begin with, this chapter will 
provide an overview of the most prominent theories of international politics as well as 
their limitations as theoretical tools for a good understanding of the particularities of this 
case. 
   
2.2. Mainstream International Relations Theories: incomplete accounts of 
South-South Development Cooperation? 
 
2.2.1. Realist theories 
Realism is considered to be the oldest theory of international politics. 
Nevertheless, this well-conceived theoretical framework remains one of the dominant 
approaches to understanding and sometimes predicting inter-state relations. Realist 
concepts, such as the security dilemma and the balance of power, derive from the notion 
of an anarchic system where states are the main actors. Realism is, above all, a state-
focused understanding of international interactions (Donnelly, 2005:30).  
For realists, states are rational entities whose ultimate goals are to survive in a 
chaotic anarchic international environment and pursue their own national interests. While 
realists agree that power is the central and only concern in international politics and that 
states constitute the main relevant actor (Clark, 2016:149), ideas vary significantly within 
the realist theory. For this reason, they shall be divided into two main sub-theories: 
“classical realism” and “neorealism” – the latter also being called structural realism. 
 With its roots in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, classical 




towards the pursuit of power and domination. For Morgenthau, interest is defined in 
terms of power (Kopalyan, 2009:31). This desire for power, inherent to human nature 
(i.e. first image), will then collectively reflect on the behaviour of states (i.e. second-
image) and their interactions in the international level (viz. third image), making states 
the central element of analysis for realist thought.  
Though both classical realists and neorealists agree on the centrality of power, 
and the struggle for power in international politics, they disagree on its conception and 
on the roots of this struggle. The classical realist conception of power differs to the 
neorealist one, going beyond military capabilities to encompass other phenomena such 
as economic, ideological and cultural power (Kopalyan, 2009:29). For Mongenthau, “it is 
not the nature or the form of power that is of essence, but rather the capacity of such 
power to establish control” (Kopalyan, 2009:29-30). 
Moreover, the reasons for this struggle are understood differently by neorealists 
and classical realists. While classical realism traces its roots back to humans’ natural 
inclination, neorealists will argue that the struggle for power and dominance in 
international politics will occur due to the inexistence of a supra-national body, or a global 
leviathan, to which states have to respond (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009:4). 
Anarchy, not human nature, is the primary cause of world conflict for neorealists. In a 
way, classical realism takes into account elements that are neglected in neorealism, such 
as the importance of looking at the individual and state levels of analysis. Furthermore, 
classical realism offers a broader conception of power, defined not only in military, but 
also economic and ideological terms (Kopalyan, 2009:28). Therefore, it can be argued 
that classical realism, though emphasising the primacy of the international system, did 
not neglect the sate and the individual levels of analysis. Yet, as stated by Taliaferro, 
Lobell & Ripsman (2009:16), classical realists did not offer a sound research programme 
for international politics studies, and often focused on unit-level analysis, overlooking the 
limitations imposed by the international system. 
Kenneth Waltz, the founder of structural realism, will advocate for a move away 
from reductionist (unit-level) approaches to international politics, such as classical 
realism, and towards a systemic approach (Kopalyan, 2009:44). Neorealism’s main 
assumptions are based on the existence of an anarchical international system, in which 
the absence of a supranational government body leads individual states to pursue a 
primary goals, i.e. their own survival, mostly achieved through the maximization of wealth 
power (Donnelly, 2000:9), which is defined mostly in military terms. Given this anarchical 
nature of world politics, every country is seen as a potential enemy, and cooperation 
among states is hard to achieve, if not impossible. Consequently, as per the neorealist 




states will be uniquely shaped by the structural constraints of the system (Waltz, 
1979:92). Thus, as with classical realism, neorealism attributes the existence of conflict 
and the pursuit of power to the anarchical nature of the international system. However, 
contrary to classical realism, neorealism states that this feature will be the one and only 
determinant of nations’ behaviour in international relations. 
Despite the relevance of realist paradigms, especially after the end of the Second 
World War, efforts to analyse Brazil’s foreign policy disposition within the realm of South-
South Development Cooperation through the lens of classical realism or neorealism are 
doomed to incompleteness. Thus, it is fundamental to understand the inadequacies of 
both sub-theories of realism for this individual case.  
Firstly, realist theories are fundamentally sceptical of international cooperation as 
an attainable practice in international relations. Drawing on the theory of classical 
realism, the idea that individuals continuously influence a country’s behaviour is a 
relevant choice for understanding Brazil’s agenda towards Africa. This is evidenced by 
the sharp contrasts between the three administrations in question. That said, the 
classical realist idea of an imperfect, egoistic and self-interested human nature, if applied 
as a point of departure for this analysis, would fail to explain Brazil’s horizontal, solidarity-
based cooperation with the developing world under Lula. Brazil-Mozambique 
cooperation practices were built consequent to a narrative of mutual benefit, solidarity 
and fairness, principles that are not considered in the realm of classical realism.  
Though the motivations behind the horizontality and solidarity narrative are 
related to the pursuit of national interests, ignoring such narrative altogether would go 
against efforts to fully understand the evolution of Brazil’s South-South agenda and its 
cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. In other words, Brazil’s pursuit of national 
development and international influence, through SSDC, can be seen as an example of 
a state in pursuit of economic and ideological power. However, the specific ways in Brazil 
framed its cooperation practices between 2003 and 2018 would be poorly analysed 
through the lens of classical realism, as this would entail rejecting key elements before 
even analysing them. 
As for the adoption of neorealism as the theoretical reference for this study, a few 
issues can be pointed out. Individuals as well as domestic constraints (of political and 
economic nature) played an essential role in the definition of Brazil’s foreign policy 
orientation under the two administrations following Lula. Thus, changes in the Brazilian 
approach to SSDC were primarily, but not exclusively, dictated by international factors, 
as neorealism would assume. Moreover, for realists, states are seen as the most 
important units in international relations, and they can be understood as unitary rational 




policy orientation towards South-South Development Cooperation, however, cannot be 
understood as the pursuit of an agenda devoid of contestation. On the contrary, the 
formulation of Brazilian foreign policy undergoes negotiation between different interest 
groups within the government and society in general. The presence of Brazilian private 
enterprises in Mozambique, for example, indicates that various non-state actors that 
have distinct interest are at play, and these have to be taken into account when analysing 
and explaining the different depths of involvement with Mozambique under different 
administrations. 
Therefore, neorealism is a relevant but inadequate tool for the analysis of Brazil’s 
rise and fall as Mozambique’s strategic development partner. Its relevance lies on the 
explanatory capacity of the systemic circumstances that led to Brazil’s emergence and 
decline between 2003 and 2018. Put differently, there is no doubt that a series of 
international events created the necessary opportunities for Brazil’s rise as a South-
South Development Cooperation partner. Similarly, international events also contributed 
towards Brazil’s more timid and constrained behaviour under Rousseff and Temer. The 
relevance of the international environment will be discussed further in the next chapters, 
but a brief outline is in order. 
Firstly, in the early 2000s, factors such as the global commodity boom and the 
emergence of China as a threat to American hegemony created promising opportunities 
for the rise of middle-power countries such as Brazil. With the advent of Lula’s rise to 
power in this period, Brazil re-formulates its policy towards the South, expanding its 
presence not only in neighbouring Latin America, but also in Africa. Secondly, the post-
2008 world crisis and the end of the commodity boom, which was a consequence of 
China’s declining economic growth, affected the Brazilian economy and put an end to 
the country’s acclaimed economic development that projected the country as a “role 
model” for the developing world. Assuming office in 2011, Dilma Rousseff faced the 
constraints of a slowing global economy in which Brazi hadl lost political space and 
material power, a situation that became more pronounced towards the end of her tenure 
and ultimately reached its worst during Michel Temer’s administration. 
That being said, systemic factors alone do not explain, for instance, the fact that 
Rousseff’s attempts to give continuity to Lula’s endeavours in the African continent were 
jeopardized by a more hostile and divisive political environment in which the President 
had to work. Likewise, systemic factors do not explain Michel Temer’s difficulty to attain 
legitimacy before Brazil’s Southern partners after the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff. 
Moreover, the ideological reorientation under Michel Temer, i.e. towards Brazil’s 




Development Cooperation agenda, meaning that changes in this domain were not solely 
forced upon by the international system.  
With regards to Mozambique in particular, a systemic interpretation would fail to 
explain the effect of political pressure, exercised by actors within the government and 
society more broadly, for a budget reduction that impacted the allocation of resources to 
development cooperation projects. Furthermore, it would also fail to recognise the impact 
of corruption accusations involving big Brazilian construction companies and 
Mozambican officials on the legitimacy of Brazilian projects in the country.  
In other words, it seems unsuitable to presume that international factors alone 
shape Brazil’s or any other country’s disposition towards South-South Development 
Cooperation practice. It seems equally inappropriate to deem Brazil’s motivations as 
merely (material) power-seeking ones. These are the two main reasons why neorealism, 
along with classical realism, has been considered an inadequate framework for this 
study.  
 As previously stated, a confluence of actors influenced the formulation of Brazil’s 
South-South Development Cooperation agenda under Lula, Rousseff and Temer. The 
idea of a “plural” state is supported by liberal theories of international politics, as well as 
the idea of a country’s predisposition to cooperate in the international arena. Therefore, 
a look into liberalism and its contributions and limitations to the case of Brazil and 
Mozambique is necessary. 
 
2.2.2. Liberal theories 
Liberal theories of international politics look at non-state actors rather than the 
state itself to explain countries’ international behaviour. Such theories provide a more 
complete account of inner state dynamics than realism, once it attempts to look inside 
the “black box” of the state by assuming that the formation of national interests in foreign 
policy will reflect the pressures exerted by non-state actors, such as individuals and the 
private sector (Slaughter, 2011: 4). In substance, domestic groups are key actors whose 
interests will be transmitted to domestic political institutions and define a country’s 
preferences. These dynamics, therefore, will change throughout time alongside 
variations on domestic and transnational contexts (Moravcsik, 2010:1). Amidst the 
different domestic aspects considered by different liberal theories are economic 
interests, political ideologies, national identity and the institutional representation of 
domestic groups. A state’s foreign policy will then be “constantly subject to capture and 





These assumptions are very useful to understand the turn in Brazil’s foreign 
policy orientation vis-à-vis the domestic dynamics, in particular upon the ascent to power 
of the Temer government in 2016. Demands from societal groups for the return of the 
investments placed in Africa under Lula (de Castro, 2013:1) were the result of a political 
process of delegitimisation of the Workers’ Party’s foreign policy agenda, encapsulated 
in the Temer government. Besides, the economic interests of the big Brazilian companies 
located in Mozambique are among the different causes for the pursuit of a more 
economic-driven approach to SSDC after Lula left office.  
However, there are two main problems with the adoption of a liberal theoretical 
framework to understand Brazil-Mozambique relations from the context of SSDC. Firstly, 
the Brazilian international agenda for cooperation and its increasing presence in Africa 
during Lula’s administration were primarily dictated by systemic factors, which allowed 
for the country’s rise to an “emerging power”. In this case, domestic dynamics cannot be 
prioritised in detriment of the international context, as it allowed for the increase in 
Brazilian SSDC initiatives and somehow constrained them at a later stage. 
Secondly, the pluralist notion of states developed by the liberal theory assumes 
that states’ interests in the international stage are defined in terms of the different interest 
groups, private actors and societal forces. These forces will compete for influence within 
the state and occasionally “capture” it (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:11). This 
notion of a weak state in constant risk of being captured and submissive to non-state 
actors’ interests would largely distort the reality Brazil’s South-South Development 
Cooperation agenda which, despite the plurality of actors involved in its formulation and 
execution, is essentially state-driven.  
As argued by Milani & Pinheiro (2013:18), the formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy 
agenda has shifted from the traditional monopoly of the Ministry of External Relations, 
or Itamaraty, towards a variety of other actors. It must be considered that different 
ministries, federal agencies and subnational entities are involved in initiating and 
implementing foreign policy, but also that non-state agents such as corporations, social 
movements, and economic sectors have growing influence in these decisions. However, 
though increasingly relevant in the debate surrounding the country’s international 
agenda, non-state actors are not the ultimate decision-makers, and the responsibility for 
policy formulation still lies with the government (Milani & Pinheiro, 2013:21).  
As for development cooperation in Mozambique, for example, the majority of the 
projects are either carried out by governmental agencies, such as the establishment of 
an antiretroviral drug manufacturing plant in Maputo by Fundação Oswaldo Cruz 




Bank (BNDES)15. Therefore, it is safe to say that, under Lula, the Brazilian state occupied 
the central role in Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation, despite the 
involvement of private capital interests and other actors. The interplay between the state 
and private interests in defining the SSDC agenda will be encapsulated in the 
Mozambican case, which will be discussed in the next chapters.  
To conclude this section, although liberalism sees international cooperation (thus 
South-South Development Cooperation) as possible as well as desirable, it fails to 
provide an appropriate theoretical framework in which state interests are accurately 
accounted for. Furthermore, liberal theories neglect the fundamental importance of 
systemic factors as determinants of the country’s opportunities and motivations (or lack 
thereof) to cooperate. Consequently, liberal theories will not fully contribute to the 
analysis of the retreat in Brazilian SSDC initiatives towards Mozambique between 2011 
and 2018.  
Having looked at the contributions and limitations of realism and liberalism to the 
purposes of this paper, constructivism and critical theories shall be considered next. 
 
2.2.3. Constructivism 
Constructivist approaches, though offering a valuable explanation of questions of 
national identity and individual perception of events in the global state, fails to accounting 
for the various domestic structures and actors influencing the direction and practices of 
a country’s foreign policy. 
Constructivism emerges as an alternative set of theories to fill the gap left by 
realist and liberal theories in explaining the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. Its 
most prominent scholar is Alexander Wendt, who as per his own statement, shares with 
realists a few assumptions, i.e. the anarchical nature of the international system; states’ 
centrality to international politics analysis and their rationality; and the importance of 
theorising on the third image (Wendt, 1995:72). According to constructive perspectives, 
however, identities and perspectives are socially constructed at the individual, national 
 
15 “The Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) is the main financing agent for development in 
Brazil. Since its foundation, in 1952, the BNDES has played a fundamental role in stimulating the 
expansion of industry and infrastructure in the country. Over the course of the Bank’s history, its 
operations have evolved in accordance with the Brazilian socio-economic challenges, and now 
they include support for exports, technological innovation, sustainable socio-environmental 
development and the modernization of public administration. The Bank offers several financial 
support mechanisms to Brazilian companies of all sizes as well as public administration entities, 
enabling investments in all economic sectors. In any supported undertaking, from the analysis 
phase up to the monitoring, the BNDES emphasizes three factors it considers strategic: 





and international levels, an idea that is best explained by Wendt’s famous statement: 
“anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992:395). Thus, constructivism argues for 
an understanding of international structures as socially, rather than materially, 
constructed (Wendt, 1995:71). The same applies to the concepts of power and interest, 
defined by shared ideas and knowledge (Wendt, 1995:74). 
Furthermore, this socially constructed international system pictured by 
constructivists will not only shape actor’s behaviour, as realists would assume, but it will 
shape their identities and interests (Wendt, 1995:72). It is, therefore, one of the main 
elements of constructivist theories to understand the international system as a socially-
constructed space where state’s identities – and consequently their interests – are fluidly 
and continuously being shaped by their interactions with one another. 
Constructivism allows for the inclusion of “intangible”, non-rational factors 
shaping agents’ interest, ideas and behaviour. Identity politics, for example, cannot be 
overlooked when understanding a country’s foreign policy agenda and its objectives. 
However, constructivism does not offer a clear research programme for the study of 
international politics, thus lacking systematic and empirical capability to understand ever-
changing identity constructions and national interests (Keohane, 1988:392)  
For the study of Brazil’s withdrawal from the international scene as a key actor of 
South-South Development Cooperation, actors’ identities and perceptions are indeed of 
relevance, however there are also objective constraints – both domestically and 
internationally – of political and material (economic) nature that will determine the 
country’s withdrawal from SSDC. In short, constructivism is applicable in several 
instances of this specific case, but certainly not sufficiently adequate. 
 
2.2.4. Critical theories 
Critical theories’ main focus are on analysing and explaining the unequal relations 
and how they are reflected in states’ interactions in the international arena. The main 
argument behind critical theories of international relations, which generally derive from 
or employ elements of the Marxist approach, is that the evolution of capitalism through 
the process of globalisation has perpetuated material inequalities within and among 
countries (Linklater, 2005:133). However, while critical theories will draw upon Marxist 
theories, it will also include the social and political domains in understanding global 
affairs, trying to provide a framework of analysis in which the exclusionary nature of 
international relations is a central assumption (Devetak, 2005:159).  
Although the Brazilian approach to SSDC under Lula was characterised by the 
“Southern” principle of horizontality and underpinned by a narrative of fair and equal 




domestic policy and foreign policy behind Lula and Rousseff’s international agenda16. 
Other studies focus particularly on the exploitative nature of Brazilian cooperation 
projects in Mozambique, raising concerns over irregular land appropriation, poor labour 
conditions, and environmental degradation. They also argue that the kind of partnership 
developed between Brazil and Mozambique is neither characterised by solidarity nor 
horizontality, as its proponents would argue. Instead, this relationship is said to be one 
of exploration that serves to increase Mozambique’s dependence on Brazilian 
investments17. 
Though extremely important to understand the outputs and long-term impact of 
Brazilian South-South Cooperation practices, this kind of analysis will not be the focus 
of this research. Rather, this thesis will investigate the broader changes in Brazil’s foreign 
policy orientation under different administrations after the Lula years, thus the “inputs” 
rather than outcomes and impact. It will do so by looking at the interplay between different 
domestic factors – without turning a blind eye to the international stage – in defining 
Brazil’s interest and disposition to engage in SSDC initiatives with Mozambique. For this 
reason, critical theories do not offer a theoretical framework upon which the main 
arguments of this thesis can be built. 
Having looked at major theories of international politics and outlined their 
contributions and limitations to the individual case under examination, it is now pertinent 
to concentrate efforts on the theoretical framework chosen as a point of departure for 
this paper, viz. neoclassical realism. 
 
2.3. Neoclassical Realism: incorporating the three levels of analysis 
 The term “neoclassical realism” was first coined by Gideon Rose in 1998, and 
presented as a theory of foreign policy that stems from the realist perspective of 
international politics. According to Rose, efforts to develop a general theory of foreign 
policy have been limited by the use of two opposite, yet complimentary, views of 
international politics. On the one extreme, Innenpolitik approaches understand domestic 
politics as key defining factors of foreign policy outcomes. Innenpolitik accounts of a 
country’s behaviour will focus on factors such as ideology, social structures, partisan 
politics and identity (Rose, 1998:148), overlooking systemic forces. The other extreme, 
or the so-called systemic approaches to international relations, is explored by different 
strands of realist theories, in which foreign policy behaviour reflects the reaction of 
 
16 See Boito, A., & Berringer, T. (2014). Social classes, neodevelopmentalism, and Brazilian 
foreign policy under presidents Lula and Dilma. Latin American Perspectives, 41(5), 94-109. 
17 See Alden, C., Chichava, S. & Alves, C. (2017) Mozambique and Brazil: Forging New 




rational and unitary states to systemic factors. By privileging international variables, 
however, most of the domestic variables are neglected (Rose, 1998:146).  
 While understanding international politics as a mere product of unit-level 
dynamics can produce misguided interpretations, purely systemic theories such as 
neorealism, on the other hand, are also doomed to eminently simplistic and, at times, 
deterministic analyses that are unable to grasp specific contexts within which a state’s 
policies are determined (Rose, 1998:147). Additionally, for Singer (1961:23), purely 
systemic approaches will fail to recognise a country’s agency or autonomy to choose its 
actions in international politics, given that it understands these unitary states – “black 
boxes” – as being impacted by systemic factors but not as agents impacting the system. 
In attempt to bridge Innenpolitik and realist understandings of states’ external 
behaviours, neoclassical realism looks at both external and internal factors in order to 
explain states’ international behaviour. The starting point of neoclassical realism, along 
the lines of other realist approaches, is the international system or third image. For 
neoclassical realists, the international system (i.e. its anarchical nature and, most 
importantly, the distribution of material power among different states) will ultimately 
define the scope and ambitions of a country’s foreign policy and of states’ interactions. 
Given that “a state’s foreign policy cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown 
up by the international environment” (Rose, 1998:151), these policies will primarily reflect 
a country’s relative power within the global system.   
However, contrary to the neorealist theory of international politics, neoclassical 
realism also incorporates domestic variables as an intervening factor in the definition and 
scope of a country’s foreign policy agenda (Rose, 1998:147). As much as international 
factors, domestic ones will also constrain and induce national leaders and states’ 
policies. For Singer (1961:27), including the nation state as an essential object of 
analysis allows for a more accurate description and in-depth explanation of specific 
events in international politics. 
The relevance of realist paradigms, as discussed earlier in this chapter, is drawn 
upon by neoclassical realism. As explained by Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman (2009:13), 
“neoclassical realism builds upon the complex relationship between the state and society 
found in classical realism without sacrificing the central insight of neorealism about the 
constraints of the international system”. Additionally, while neorealism tries to identify 
and analyse recurring patterns of behaviour in international politics, neoclassical realism 
tries to assess countries’ responses to the circumstances of the international system 
(Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 2009:21-22).  
Neoclassical realism will then reject the idea of a perfect “transmission belt” 




way in which internal aspects of states will impact leaders’ perception of international 
threats and opportunities and shape a country’s economic, military and diplomatic 
policies abroad. Therefore, the first image, or the “individual”, must be equally analysed. 
Among factors to be considered in the domestic domain are the state’s capacity to extract 
and mobilise the necessary national resources for the pursuit of international strategies; 
the influence of domestic actors (i.e. legislators, political parties, and others) and interest 
groups (such as economic segments); the social cohesion of societies; and the latter’s 
impact on national policies vis-à-vis state autonomy (Taliaferro, Lobell & Ripsman, 
2009:4).  
In other words, leaders will constantly play what Putnam (1988:434) describes as 
a two-level game, in which their response to international incentives or threats occurs 
simultaneously and not independently from the domestic institutional setting and 
domestic actors, i.e. there is constant bargaining with the domestic society (from which 
resources are extracted and mobilised) and the states’ key stakeholders (Taliaferro, 
Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:7). While leaders will ultimately define national interests by 
assessing international opportunities and threats from a privileged position (for example, 
where they have more access to information), this process is more complex than 
assumed by realists, and often entails negotiating with other sectors and actors within 
the state (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:26).  
Furthermore, the impact of non-state or sub-state actors on a country’s foreign 
policy decisions will increase the more vulnerable this state and its ruling political elites 
are. Therefore, “less autonomous states must frequently build coalitions and make 
compromises to mobilise social and political actors in order to enact policy” (Taliaferro, 
Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:27) and their “vulnerability to violent overthrow[…]inhibit the 
state’s ability to respond to systemic pressures (Taliaferro, Lobell, & Ripsman, 2009:28). 
This will be of utmost importance when assessing Rousseff’s weakened authority to give 
continuity to her predecessor’s foreign policy agenda. Against the backdrop of a 
legitimacy crisis and a divided political environment at home, Rousseff had to respond 
to a lot of pressure from her political opposition and segments of the civil society, a 
situation that would reach its climax with the impeachment in 2016. 
 A neoclassical realist account of international politics understands systemic 
factors as the main drivers of foreign policy, particularly dictated by a country’s relative 
material power in relation to others, an idea that steams from classical realism. However, 
neoclassical realism argues that these external variables alone will not determine 
specific state choices of course of action or their behaviour. State-level factors, such as 
the perception of leaders and political elites of their relative material power, as well as 





Systemic pressures and incentives may shape the broad contours and general direction 
of foreign policy without being strong or precise enough to determine the specific details 
of state behavior. This means that the influence of systemic factors may often be more 
apparent from a distance than from up close - for example, in significantly limiting the 
menu of foreign policy choices considered by a state’s leaders at a particular time, rather 
than in forcing the selection of one particular item on that menu over another (Rose, 
1998:147). 
 
Therefore, for neoclassical realists, a better understanding of a country’s foreign 
policy formulation and implementation entails a closer examination of how systemic 
circumstances will play out within the domestic domain. Most specifically of how they will 
limit or broaden leaders’ scope of action within a specific state structure (Rose, 
1998:152).  As for the nature of Brazil’s international agenda, there is consensus among 
scholars that  the definition of the scope of South-South Development Cooperation 
projects was heavily influenced by presidential role, that characterises how specific 
leaders’ personalities will shape perceptions and responses to systemic forces (Faria & 
Paradis, 2013; Burges & Bastos, 2017), but also by unit-level elements such as partisan 
politics (Nery, 2017) and by the agency of other actors – the Itamaraty, federal agencies, 
NGOs and social movements as well as private enterprises (de la Fontaine & Seifert, 
2010). 
In De Dutra a Lula: a condução e os determinantes da política externa brasileira, 
political scientist Amorim Neto develops an in-depth analysis of the determinants of 
Brazilian foreign policy between 1946 and 2008, during eighteen different 
administrations. Amorim Neto uses the country’s voting behaviour in the UN General 
Assembly as a quantitative indicator of Brazil’s foreign policy orientation in order to test 
whether it is unit-level or systemic factors that play a more decisive role in shaping the 
country’s agenda.  By making use of several systemic as well as domestic variables, the 
research concludes that systemic forces are the primary conditioning elements of 
Brazilian foreign policy orientation, though domestic aspects such as the ideological 
leaning of the president’s cabinet also impacted significantly (Malamud, 2012:121-122). 
However, it is suggested that the degree of support for and personal involvement of the 
president affects the way in which bureaucratic traditions and ideological orientations 
interplay and respond to systemic constraints and incentives (Malamud, 2012:122) 
Similarly, Malamud’s (2017:150) assessment of Brazil’s rise as a global power 
under Lula pays good attention to the systemic causes that, according to him, created a 




thesis, the capability of a new power to rise is decided by the permissiveness or 
restrictiveness of the global affairs, dictated in terms of degrees of polarity and rivalry 
(Malamud, 2017:150). Between 1991 and 2011, key external events and conditions 
allowed for Brazil’s growing presence in the international stage: the fall of the Soviet 
Union and end of a bipolar world, which allowed for regional and middle powers to 
become more proactive; the nonexistence of enemies, conflict or nuclear powers in 
South America and the creation of the Mercosur (Commom Market of the South) in 1991, 
characterising a relatively peaceful regional setting for Brazil’s rise and the emergence 
of China in the early 2000s (Malamud, 2017:152).  
Brazil’s “rollback”, in a similar way, will also be internationally conditioned by, 
among other factors, the economic slowdown in Europe and the US, China’s declining 
economic growth and revisionist intentions, as well as an apparent reduction in “global 
demand for softer, greener and gentle powers” after Trump’s rise to power (Malamud, 
2017:159,161). However, this thesis will argue that domestic elements played a 
fundamental role in defining the scope of Brazil’s foreign policy, both during its “rise” and 
its “decline”. While political stability, presidential activism and the success of economic 
policies in the domestic sphere will push the country’s global ambitions forward under 
Lula, poor leadership, economic and political constraints and the country’s stained image 
abroad due to corruption scandals will determine Brazil’s drastic retraction from its 
international ambitions, affecting primarily its humanitarian and cooperation agenda 
(Malamud, 2017:163). 
 
2.4. Concluding remarks 
The aforementioned context leaves no doubt about the complexities behind 
Brazil’s formulation of its foreign policy, especially in the realm of SSDC. The country’s 
rise as a key player in the international development landscape can be explained in 
relation to the conduciveness of the international political economy in the early 2000s. 
However, the configuration of Lula’s SSDC agenda surely carried the specificities of the 
domestic environment, such as the President’s own views and ambitions and the state-
led model of development implemented at home. Similarly, Brazil’s withdrawal from 
Lula’s international project after 2010 are informed by both the constraints imposed by 
the international environment and the way it unfolded within the domestic remain. Thus, 
neoclassical realism offers a more comprehensive framework for analysing the various 
aspects pertaining to the subject under study. It is argued that SSDC initiatives with 
Mozambique declined in response to the changes in Brazil’s foreign policy orientation, 
which were dictated by both domestic and international factors during the two 




Chapter III: Brazil’s Foreign Policy and South-South Development 
Cooperation in Mozambique: the Lula years (2003-2010) 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 The incorporation of “development” into Brazil’s international agenda is not a 
complete novelty. As pointed out by Dauvergne and Farias (2012:907), this idea can be 
traced back to the emergence of the Independent Foreign Policy (Política Externa 
Independente18) of the 1960s. At the time, however, Brazil’s foreign policy was 
permeated with the politics of the Cold war, and it emphasised the economic aspects of 
development, in particular the commercial ones. Moreover, that was period in which 
colonisation was still intact as a political project in most parts of the Third World, hindering 
the forging of solid ties between Brazil and countries in Africa and Asia, for instance.  
In the years that followed, the 1980s and 1990s, Brazil’s transition from over two 
decades of military government (1964-1985) to democracy saw a detachment from the 
former’s “national-developmentalist economic model of state intervention and import 
substitution” (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012:907). With the rise of global neoliberalism, the 
developmental approach was replaced with a neoliberal approach to both domestic and 
international politics, pushing both “development” and the developing world away from 
the country’s foreign policy. As a result, major changes in the country’s foreign policy 
would only come about in the early 2000s, shaped by the transformations of international 
dynamics and Brazilian domestic politics alike. 
Against this background, the Lula government can be considered the starting 
point of Brazil’s rise as a “global developmental power” (Dauvergne and Farias, 2012), 
a status pursued mostly through the intensification of the South-South relations 
approach. As per the hypotheses under investigation for this thesis, and in order to 
understand the transformation of Brazilian foreign policy and its impact on cooperation 
for development in Mozambique during Rousseff’s and Temer’s administrations, it is 
imperative to begin with a careful analysis of Brazil’s emergence under Lula (2003-2010). 
Functioning as a tool for the achievement of the country’s international ambitions, South-
South Development Cooperation mirrored and aided Brazil’s development at the same 
time. As for Africa, the continent was given a prominent role within Lula’s foreign policy 
agenda, and Mozambique figures as an important illustration of the nuances of Brazil’s 
SSDC.  
 
18 Within the context of the Cold War, the Independent Foreign Policy sought to minimise the 
effects of the bipolar world order on national development projects. Accordingly, Brazil’s 
international agenda should foster new partnerships devoid of political ideologies (Oliveira, 




In other words, while Brazil’s bilateral relations with Mozambique in the twenty-
first century, particularly with respect to cooperation for development, needs to be 
understood within the broader Brazilian agenda for South-South Development 
Cooperation with Africa, the latter cannot be fully comprehended without a closer 
examination of the country’s renewed international ambitions under President Lula’s two 
terms in office (2003-2006 and 2007-2010). According to Saraiva (2010:169), reviving 
and strengthening ties with the African continent as a whole characterised one of the 
major instruments for the realisation of Brazil’s desired global prominence in the new 
century. This new foreign policy agenda, called “assertive” by Lula’s foreign minister 
Celso Amorim19, was not only the result of pro-active foreign policy decision makers such 
as Lula and Amorim themselves, but was also shaped and made possible by the 
favourable environment for the rise of Brazil, both domestically and internationally.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter will aim to shed light into the events prior to 
the decision to “pull the plug” on cooperation for development in Mozambique between 
2011 and 2018. The chapter will be structured in two parts. The first part will attempt to 
locate the SSDC agenda in Africa within Brazil’s broader national and international 
aspirations during Lula’s administration. In accordance with the assumptions of 
neoclassical realism, Brazil’s ambitions cannot transcend the space and the 
opportunities provided by the existing world order. In the same vein, such opportunities 
are not automatically translated into foreign policy, but undergo a complex process of 
filtering, interpreting and planning in the domestic domain, hence the need to look 
carefully at the domestic setup. The transformations in the global dynamics and the shift 
away from American hegemony towards the emerging developing world characterise a 
fundamental stepping stone for Brazil’s emergence as a key SSDC player, particularly in 
Africa. Notwithstanding these international elements, however, the analysis will be 
largely centred on the domestic sphere, where such opportunities were read and 
translated in relation to the opportunities and constraints of national politics and, more 
importantly, mirroring the developmental project that was installed.   
The second part of this chapter will focus primarily on the case study in question, 
Brazil’s development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique. Rather than an attempt to 
outline the perceptions, results or impact of Brazil’s cooperation projects in Mozambique, 
efforts will be channelled into placing Mozambique within Brazil’s broader South-South 
Development Cooperation agenda under Lula, shedding light into the nature of this 
relationship and its nuances. This should afford the author the chance to understand 
Mozambique’s place and relevance within Brazil’s foreign policy agenda, as well as start 
 





mapping what domestic and international elements enabled this relationship to reach 
unprecedented levels between 2003 and 2010. 
This chapter will argue that the foundations of Brazil’s South-South Development 
Cooperation agenda were laid by the Lula government’s two pronged approach 
socioeconomic development, on the one hand, and Brazil’s reformist ambitions on the 
international stage, on the other. Put differently, Brazil’s successful experiences of 
economic growth with social inclusion, in the Lula government, were exported to other 
developing countries through SSDC initiatives, as in the case of Mozambique. At the 
same time, development cooperation provided Brazil with the necessary credentials to 
consolidate its leadership aspirations and granted the political support it needed in its 
reformist aspirations, i.e. the reform of the UN and the WTO, for instance, in order to 
serve the developmental goals of the developing world. 
 
 
3.2. Brazil’s foreign policy disposition under Lula and the South-South 
Development Cooperation Agenda in Africa: navigating between national 
and international goals 
 Although Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation agenda was not limited 
to Africa, the continent played a fundamental role in shaping the Brazilian strategy 
towards the developing world, especially under Lula’s two terms in office. As much as 
SSDC is an essential tool of the country’s renewed aspirations in its foreign relations, 
Africa is one of the major spaces in which this new policy was experimented, deepened 
and legitimised.  
Brazil’s relations with the continent can be traced as far back as the years of 
slavery, but were formalised upon the onset of independence of African countries in the 
twentieth century. However, close and stable relations between both sides of the Atlantic 
were not an immediate result of this formalisation of diplomatic ties. On the contrary, 
Brazil’s Africa agenda has always been a shifting, inconsistent one, in which the level of 
depth of Brazil’s involvement with the continent were defined and re-defined by the ruling 
decision makers’ motivations and priorities (Mapa, 2011b:9). Nonetheless, it is widely 
accepted that this relationship was renewed and strengthened during the first decade of 
the new millennium, informed by Lula’s national and global ambitions. 
There is enough evidence on the ground to attest to changes in Brazil’s diplomacy 
towards Africa after the rise of President Lula to power in 2003. During his eight years in 
office, the President visited 25 African countries and his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim 
visited 40 (Cicalo, 2012:7). Presidential visits to the continent totalled to 33 (Chichava, 




from 18 to 36. At the same time, the number African diplomatic representations in Brazil 
also increased from 16 to 29 between 2003 and 2009 (Mapa, 2011b:8). Moreover, trade 
between Brazil and Africa increased from US$4 billion to US$20 billion in the same 
period (Chichava, 2017:381), and there was also a substantial augment in the budget 
destined to South-South Development Cooperation projects in the African continent, 
from US$524,000 in 2003 to US$20 million in 2010, culminating in a total of 30 recipient 
countries (da Costa Filho, 2018:84). In 2010, 57 per cent of Brazil’s technical cooperation 
budget was directed towads African countries, of which 26 per cent, 22 per cent and 12 
per cent were earmarked for agriculture, health and education, respectively. Among 
Africa’s largest beneficiaries of the country’s technical cooperation were the Portuguese-
speaking African countries (Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa – PALOP), 
with 74 per cent of the budget (Chichava, 2017:381). 
 In Amorim’s own words, “South–South cooperation is a diplomatic strategy that 
originates from an authentic desire to exercise solidarity toward poorer countries. At the 
same time, it helps expand Brazil’s participation in world affairs. […] Building coalitions 
with developing countries is also a way of engaging in the reform of global governance 
in order to make international institutions fairer and more democratic.” (Amorim, 
2010:231). The configuration of this strategy international prominence, however, reflects 
the opportunities posed by the new dynamics of the international political economy 
during those years, in which Brazil saw room for the country’s increasing protagonism 
and for multilateralism (Mapa, 2011a:6).  
 
3.2.1. Brazil’s rise to global prominence 
 The last three decades saw a significant rearrangement of global production 
networks, with larger participation of countries from the South, as opposed to the 
historical dominance of the industrialised North (Gray & Gills 2016:558). As per foreign 
minister Amorim (2010:215), the rise of emerging powers such as Brazil, China and India 
characterise “the most important phenomenon of the post-Cold War period”, further 
contributing to the redistribution of international power and the configuration of a 
multipolar global order.  
This movement was intensified by the 2008 financial crisis and its subsequent 
years, when the economies of the North plummeted and the prevailing economic model 
was delegitimised by the devastating socio-economic consequences. The global 
financial crisis tilted the balance of forces in the international system, characterised by 
the decline of central economies and the emergence of important players in global 





  For Brazil, this realignment of forces and the emergence of multiple new powers 
created favourable opportunities which, supported by a democratic and economically 
stable realityat home, informed the country’s new foreign policy disposition in the twenty-
first century (Trinkunas, 2014:12). Brazil’s characterisation as an important emerging 
power, fuelled by the publication of the Goldman Sachs’ report about the potential BRIC 
countries in 201120, was legitimised by the country’s active participation in world 
governance frameworks under Lula’s administration. Devoid of rivalry both regionally 
and globally, Brazil achieved considerable levels of economic growth pushed by the rise 
of China as a major market for Brazilian commodities (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173). 
Moreover, Brazil legitimised its international agenda through active participation in 
multilateral bodies such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Group of 
Twenty (G20), including United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations.   
 Moreover, Brazil’s pro-reform attitude towards Inter-Governmental Organisations 
(IGOs), such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and 
its protagonist role in the establishment of multilateral frameworks such as the BRICS 
and IBSA, enhanced the country’s Global South identity and its aspirations as a leader 
of the South (Trinkunas, 2014:20). In Ideological Repertoires of the Brazilian Foreign 
Policy toward Africa across three presidential administrations (1995-2016): from realism 
to south-south solidarity, and back, Brazilian diplomat José Joaquim Gomes da Costa 
Filho examines the different repertoires driving Brazil’s agenda towards Africa under the 
presidencies of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula and Rousseff. Through the analysis 
of official speeches and publications, da Costa Filho sows that Brazil’s self-identification 
shifted significantly under the Lula government, moving away from the identity of “a 
developing country with global ambitions” towards a renovated self-image of belonging 
to the Global South, but holding the material capabilities and intentions to challenge the 
existing international order (da Costa Filho, 2018:97) 
While the 1980s and the 1990s were difficult years for both Brazil and Africa, the 
first decades of the twenty-first century gave rise to a more optimistic scenario. The 
consolidation of democracy after 198521 in Brazil and its macroeconomic improvement, 
in step with Africa’s economic recovery, set a more favourable environment for Africa’s 
resurgence in Brazil’s international agenda, especially under Lula (Chichava, Alves & 
Alden, 2017:2). The establishment of the country’s SSDC agenda, with Africa in its 
centre, is a reflection of the changing prospects for development of both sides of the 
 
20 O’Neill, J. 2001. Building better global economic BRICs. Global Economics Paper, 66. New 
York: Goldman-Sachs 
21 The year of 1985 marked the beginning of the redemocratisation era in Brazil, following two 




Atlantic and a result of the increasingly relevant role of the South in the international 
development landscape. Besides increasing economic power, the prevalence of 
underdevelopment and inequality within the South worsened due to the unequal nature 
of international system, which resulted in renewed efforts to challenge the established 
global order. In this context, South-South Development Cooperation emerges as both a 
tool for the South’s project of structural transformation and the hope for development 
through mutual support amongst the South (Gray & Gills, 2016:557).  
Faced with new opportunities in the international system, Brazil reformulates its 
global agenda. A combination of elements in Brazilian politics, alongside the formulation 
of a new approach to national development, contributed to the configuration of Brazil’s 
SSDC strategy. As a result, Africa’s place in this new setting will be redefined, in 
particular from the perspective of development cooperation. 
 
3.2.2. Domestic factors shaping South-South Development Cooperation in Africa 
Lula and Amorim’s “assertive” foreign policy was shaped and carried out by a 
variety of other domestic actors. Going beyond Itamaraty and committed presidential 
diplomacy, the new foreign policy was built upon the ruling party’s views of international 
politics and Lula’s progressive government coalition, as well as the influence of segments 
of the civil society (de Almeida, 2007:5).  The next sections will outline some of the 
distinctive characteristics of domestic politics in the period between 2003 and 2010 which 
drove Brazil’s rise as an international player, in particular within the South-South 
Development Cooperation realm. This amalgamation of elements will characterise the 
domestic environment within which Lula’s foreign policy objectives were formulated, 
implemented and, to an extension, legitimised. By delineating them, it will also be easier 
to draw a parallel between the Lula government and the subsequent periods of Brazilian 
foreign policy, under Rousseff and Temer, particularly within the realm of South-South 
Development Cooperation. 
 
3.2.2.1. Beyond Itamaraty: domestic actors determining South-South Development 
Cooperation  
 The foreign policy decision-making process in Brazil has profoundly changed 
since the advent of democracy (mid-1980s) and the Constitution of 1988. The 
democratisation of the state, the internationalisation of the economy and the interplay 
between the international and the domestic domains have forced a move away from the 
monopoly of Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or Itamaraty, over decisions 
contemplating Brazil’s international agenda (Milani, 2015:57). Articles 21 and 84 of the 




primary formulators of foreign policy (Milani, 2015:59). For Milani (2015:59), Brazilian 
foreign policy navigates between the status of a “state policy” – attending to permanent 
concerns over security, territorial integrity and sovereignty, for example – and a “public 
policy”, negotiated among different social actors, their agenda, interests and perceptions 
of Brazil’s role in the international order. He further argues that, since democratisation, 
the formulation of the international agenda entails negotiation between the Executive 
and other actors such as Parliament, Ministries, federal agencies, sub national entities, 
private sector, civil society, social movements and even academia (Milani, 2015:57). 
 The expansion of Africa’s role in Brazil’s global plans during said period was 
made possible by the rise to power of a political group dismissive of mainstream 
neoliberal principles of self-regulating markets and assumptions of a well-balanced and 
advantageous global capitalism. This ideological foundation encompasses not only Lula 
himself, but also a variety of other domestic actors and entities, such as political coalition, 
party politics, and the economic and social experience at home. 
Lula’s progressive Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores – PT) understands 
that foreign policy should concentrate efforts towards enhancing the country’s position 
vis-à-vis its relations with the North. This should be realised through mechanisms of 
multilateralism, regional integration, and proximity with the South. Moreover, the use of 
protective measures against unfair international trade (Oliveira & Onuki, 2010:167) is 
seen as essential for developing economies to achieve sustainable economic growth.  
Inspired by these motives, the party advocates for the employment of South-South 
Cooperation as the major tool for increasing Brazil’s international profile. In this process, 
the party also advocates for a strong state that participates and intervenes in the 
structuring and implementation of foreign policy, from foreign trade to national security 
(Oliveira & Onuki, 2010:169). 
Beyond party ideologies, the formulation of Brazil’s global agenda reflects the 
perceptions of the major foreign policy decision makers about the international system 
and global politics. President Lula’s inner circle of foreign policy makers and advisors 
included his Foreign Minister Celso Amorim; Ambassador and General Secretary of 
International Relations Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães; and the president’s Special Advisor 
on International Affairs Marco Aurélio Garcia. These officials shared the understanding 
of evident instability in the established international order and a propitious environment 
for multilateralism, in which the North-South asymmetric relations should be confronted.  
The country’s major national interest, development (which also entailed expansion of 
international trade and internationalisation of Brazilian companies) and Brazil’s goal of 
international leadership should be pursued through South-South Cooperation for 




The ideological motivations of the Lula government found support in the 
nationalist, developmentalist and pro-integration group of diplomats within the Brazilian 
Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty)22, who retained hegemony within the institution throughout 
the eight years of Lula in office (Mapa, 2011a:7). This environment, in turn, paved the 
way for a foreign policy agenda based on principles of deepened South-South relations 
(Mapa, 2011a:2). A clear manifestation of the new place occupied by Africa in the 
country’s international relations took place within the structure of Itamaraty itself. 
President Lula initiated significant structural changes in the operation framework of the 
ministry, starting by the disintegration of the Department of Africa and the Middle East in 
order to form the Africa Division III (DAF-III), which joined the two existing Africa Division 
I and Africa Division II. This was an indication of the central position of the continent in 
Brazil’s foreign policy. As for Itamaraty’s Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), it 
occupied a leading role in the coordination of multiple SSDC actors and projects 
(Chichava et al, 2013:7) and had its budget significantly increased with the intensification 
of the country’s cooperation activities, as will be shown later in this chapter. 
Welding all these elements together, the role of the president as the ultimate 
foreign policy decision-maker can neither be overlooked nor underplayed in twenty-first 
century Brazil. In fact, scholars have argued that, given the bureaucratic nature of 
Itamaraty and its resistance to innovation, “presidential diplomacy” is the primary driver 
of the formulation and execution of innovative Brazilian foreign policy (Burges & Bastos, 
2017:287). This argument was substantiated by Lula’s intense participation in Brazil’s 
international insertion. In search for influence and legitimisation within the South and, 
particularly, in Africa, the image of a president who personally experienced poverty and 
hunger held significant power (Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683). As a result, the idea 
of Brazil as Africa’s major cooperation partner was personified in the image of Lula, most 
notably in his approach towards Africa23.  
For Stolte (2015), the president’s “very personal engagement was an essential 
part not just of the decision to have Brazil take a very active and engaged approach to 
Africa and the global South, but also in the implementation of the policy by using his 
 
22 Mapa stresses the existence, within Itamaraty, of two major ideological groups that diverge in 
terms of the directions of Brazil’s foreign policy, i.e. the “autonomous”, which disapprove of total 
alignment with the United States and support South-South relations; and a group that wishes to 
strengthen Brazil’s ties with more advanced economies (Mapa, 2011a:16). 
23 In 2005, upon his visit to the House of Slaves and the Door of No Return in Senegal, Lula was 
called “the first black President of Brazil” by the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade. After 
crying and apologising for Brazil’s “grave historical mistake”, referring the country’s past of 
slavery, Lula was also told to persevere with his policy towards Africa. “Do not give up, even if 
this makes other presidents jealous. And consider yourself an African”, said President Wade 





personal presence as a central driver to build and entrench new bilateral linkages” 
(Stolte, 2015 cited Burges & Bastos, 2017:284). Though very positive for Brazil during 
Lula’s administrations, the president’s personal engagement in Brazil’s international 
development agenda helped create a mistaken idea of Brazil’s SSDC, personalised by 
some as a “Lula agenda” rather than a “Brazilian” initiative. In this context, de Almeida 
(2010:176), points out that “not surprisingly, the personal figure of da Silva is even more 
present [in the world agenda] than the country, which confirms the real success of his 
diplomacy in projecting his own image as the personification of Brazil”. This will explain 
some of the difficulties experienced by his predecessor, Dilma Rousseff, to be discussed 
in the next chapter. 
Lastly, the president found support in a government coalition called “productivist” 
(produtivista) by Nery (2017:253), representative of the interests of workers and social 
movements, as well as part of the private sector or national bourgeoisie – construction, 
mining, commodity processors and agribusiness companies. This heterogeneous group 
will help inform foreign policy decisions, especially within the context of South-South 
Development Cooperation, which the private sector will see as an opportunity to 
internationalise and increase its presence in Africa and, in particular, Mozambique.  
The process of internationalisation of Brazilian large corporations in the Lula 
government was mostly funded by the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), under the 
banner of “national champions”. The funds of the federal development bank, created in 
1952, were traditionally directed towards national development projects, particularly 
large-scale ones. Under Lula, however, the agency`s mandate was expanded and the 
BNDES also begin to fund the internationalisation of Brazilian companies Bohn 
(2019:79). BNDES’ funding increased from R$10 billion in 1996 to R$137 billion in 2009. 
As per the “national champions” Casanova (2009:43-44) stresses the fact that there is 
no clear criterion for the selection of these national champions, but they are mostly blue-
chip Brazilian companies that have a global reach. Nonetheless, the government’s 
financial support for the internationalisation of Brazilian enterprises is evidence of strong 
public-private partnerships between the state and the business community, a 
characteristic feature of Lula’s administration. In other words, Brazil’s SSDC agenda 
coincided, in many ways, with the interests of the Brazilian private sector. The interests 
of the Brazilian enterprises were represented by segments of Lula’s political coalition 
(i.e. the national elite), which worked hand-in-hand with more progressive groups (Cason 
& Power, 2009:129). 
 Having looked at the major actors that shaped Brazil’s South-South agenda in 
the Lula government, it is necessary to go a step further with the analysis of the domestic 




development cooperation towards the South characterised the Lula government’s main 
instrument for the pursuit of the country’s development. Conversely, Brazil achieved its 
necessary credentials as a development cooperation partner due to its acclaimed 
developmental experiences. This interplay between foreign policy and the domestic 
model of development is key to understand Brazil’s SSDC agenda during and after Lula 
and is the focus of the next section. 
 
3.2.2.2. “Two sides of the same coin”: the national project of development and 
Brazilian SSDC 
The history of Brazil-Africa relations shows that the presence of Brazilian 
companies on the continent does not initiate under the umbrella of development 
cooperation. By the late-1970s, several Brazilian businesses had already started its 
activities in different African countries, most notably the mining company Vale, state-
owned oil company Petrobrás, as well as big construction and engineering companies 
such as Odebrecht and Mendes Jr (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:14). During the 1990s, 
Brazilian politics were led by a series of neoliberal governments, from Fernando Collor 
to Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1990-2002), a period in which the distance between 
Brazil and Africa steadily decreased, but the presence of Brazilian companies on the 
continent remained significant (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:11). 
Needless to say, Africa’s large market potential and its natural resources, in 
particular oil, are also appealing to Brazil’s growth and development ambitions. This fact 
helped consolidate the continent as a strategic partner (Cicalo, 2012:8) and can be 
illustrated by the growing trade between the two sides of the Atlantic as well as the 
increasing presence of the largest Brazilian energy company, Petrobras, in several 
African countries (Cicalo, 2012:8). Though the country’s Africa agenda spoke directly to 
Brazil’s political and economic ambitions (as will be illustrated with the Mozambican case 
later in this chapter), it also entailed an approach that responds to the necessities and 
aspirations of African countries (Mapa, 2011b:11).  
In facing similar economic and social challenges, Brazil and Africa found common 
ground upon which to build trust and strengthen cooperation. The incorporation of the 
“solidarity” principle into Lula’s foreign policy toward Africa, the foundational element of 
Brazil’s South-South Cooperation, was based on building horizontal relationships with 
African countries in which the gains would be mutual (da Costa Filho, 2018:108). 
Furthermore, Brazil’s successful experiences in fighting hunger and inequality – as 
previously discussed – helped legitimise its move towards Africa (Cicalo, 2012:9). 
Acting as “two sides of the same coin” (de Lima & Hirst 2006:21), the country’s 




development. Conversely, “the return to democracy, monetary stability, economic 
growth, poverty reduction, improvement in social indicators, internationalisation of 
Brazilian companies, the change of status from debtor to creditor, all add up to redefine 
Brazil’s image in the world” (Amorim, 2010:216). Under Lula, the maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability and promotion of Brazilian businesses occurred in parallel with 
significant policies to fight hunger, poverty and inequality (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173).  
Surely Brazil’s recent experience with growth and distribution sparked the interest 
of the international community, particularly of other developing countries. Pushed by the 
rise of China and the commodity prices, Brazil’s Gross National Product (GNP) grew at 
an average of 4.2 per cent yearly between 2003 and 2008, reaching 7.5 per cent in 2010 
after the slowdown experienced in 2009 with the advent of the financial crisis (da Silva 
& Pérez, 2019:173). Unemployment, in the same period, decreased from 11.3 per cent 
to 6.1 per cent. This economic growth was accompanied by the implementation of major 
cash transfer programmes such as Bolsa Familia – which target the poor and extremely 
poor – and an increase in the real minimum wage (Curado, 2015:90). As a result, 32 
million Brazilians were lifted out of poverty (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:173). For Faria & 
Paradis (2013:14), this successful story gave Brazilians a sentiment of collective pride 
and legitimised the country’s international ambitions as leader of the Global South and 
key development cooperation partner. Within this context, Africa became an important 
space in which Brazil’s successful domestic policies could be emulated. By bolstering its 
SSDC agenda, Brazil projected its national model of development abroad and attended 
to the needs of poorer countries such as Mozambique. At the same time, it developed 
new alliances and acquired the necessary political support for its reformist aspirations in 
the international system. 
In other words, the success of the President’s developmental strategy helped 
improve the country’s international standing and provided the necessary credentials for 
Brazil to strengthen its SSDC initiatives, particularly in a continent bedevilled by high 
levels of hunger and poverty. For the new political leadership, Brazil’s pursuit of national 
development with social justice also entailed an assertive and pro-active approach to 
international politics to reduce the asymmetries of the international system, increase the 
country’s bargaining power and push for the necessary reforms, which could only be 
achieved by strengthening the ties with Brazil’s South American neighbours and the rest 
of the developing world, particularly with Africa (Mapa, 2011a:4). Moreover, the 
development of alliances and policies of economic, technical, scientific and technological 
cooperation with African countries could contribute to the expansion of Brazil’s economic 




 Another significant domestic initiative that reflected on Brazil`s cooperation 
agenda towards Africa was the government’s efforts to reduce race inequalities and 
improve race relations domestically. This element will play a relevant role in the 
formulation of Brazil-Africa relations, and will be discussed next.   
 
3.2.2.3. Brazil’s race relations and the African Agenda 
Brazil’s large black population, the largest outside Africa, is mostly a 
consequence of the country’s historical ties to the continent. Besides being the largest 
recipient of African slaves between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries, Brazil 
only abolished slavery in 1888, after all the other American countries. For this reason, 
as well as the continuous flow of trade and people between Brazil and West Africa up 
until the declaration of independence by the majority of the continent, Africa is naturally 
and inherently an important part of Brazilian culture and national identity. Furthermore, 
contrary to the USA and South Africa, Brazil did not pursue or implement a racialised 
system of segregation, and was for long considered a “racial democracy” where blacks 
and whites lived harmoniously together (Cicalo, 2012: 20).  
While Brazil used this positive image as a way to legitimise itself to newly 
independent African countries up until the 1970s and 1980s, it highly contradicted the 
racial inequality and the reality of race relations experienced at home (Cicalo, 2012:4). 
Over time, however, this approach in Brazil’s Africa policy moved away from the “now-
discredited concept of racial democracy to one of racial healing and strength through 
diversity” (Captain, 2010:190). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, redemocratisation and liberal policies favoured the 
emergence of Brazil’s movimento negro (black movement) and paved the way for 
affirmative action in a country prepared to acknowledge and address racial inequality. 
However, Brazil’s relations with the West outpaced those with the developing world in 
the same period, in particular with the African continent (Cicalo, 2012:6). Under Lula, 
Brazil’s agenda towards Africa was deeply connected to the changing dynamics of race 
relations domestically. The prevalent discourse of the Brazilian Africanness and the 
historical racial inequality are now strategically used by those who hold the power of 
decision-making in Brazil’s foreign policy, including the Itamaraty (Cicalo, 2012:10). 
Lula’s Workers’ Party’s proximity with different social movements, including the 
movimento negro, increased the interest in reviving and promoting cultural ties with the 
African continent as part of the new developmental project (Mapa, 2011b:7) and the 
promotion of blackness both domestically and transnationally (Cicalo, 2012:14). 
Achieving coherence between domestic racial politics and Brazil’s policies towards Africa 




of the Brazilian black movement. Immediately after assuming office, Lula passed the Law 
10.639/03, which made the teaching of African and Afro-Brazilian history and culture 
compulsory in public and private schools throughout the country. Later in 2003, the 
government launched the Special Secretariat for Policies to Promote Racial Equality 
(Secretaria Nacional de Políticas de Promoção da Igualdade Racial - SEPPIR), aiming 
at the protection of the individual rights of racial and ethnical groups affected by 
discrimination, in particular Brazil’s black population (Lechini, 2018:408). 
In other words, a fundamental motivating factor behind Brazil’s agenda for Africa 
was to respond to domestic demands for the legitimisation of an Afro-Brazilian identity 
(Mapa, 2011b:10; Captain, 2010:194) by strengthening the ties with the continent and 
addressing the “historical debt”. By calling Africa “one of the cradles of Brazilian 
civilisations” (Captain 2010:190) and stating that Brazil had a moral “debt” to the 
continent, Lula moved the country’s approach to Africa towards solidarity and 
development cooperation (Cicalo, 2012:11), making SSDC one the foundations of the 
president’s African agenda.  
Having looked at the domestic determinants of Brazil’s development cooperation 
agenda towards the African continent, it is now appropriate to devote attention to the 
country case under analysis. Mozambique occupies a very particular position within 
Brazilian SSDC agenda. Featuring as the largest recipient of Brazil’s technical 
cooperation under Lula, it is also an important destination for Brazilian private capital. 
This two-sided strategy illustrates the nuances of Brazil’s SSDC initiatives in Africa 
(Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2). With the intention of placing Mozambique within the 
scope of SSDC in Brazil’s foreign policy agenda, the next section will focus on 
development cooperation initiatives initiated under Lula’s administration, with special 
attention given to the role played by Brazilian state actors, though not ignoring the 
converging interests of private sectors.  
 
3.3. Brazil and Mozambique: South-South Development Cooperation between 
2003 and 2010  
The independence of Mozambique from the Portuguese in 1975 marked the 
beginning of the diplomatic relations between Brazil and the former Portuguese colony. 
However, as Pereira & Tatim (2017:22) argue, the years that followed were characterised 
by unfavourable conditions both in Mozambique and in Brazil. The Mozambican post-
independence civil conflict only came to an end in 1992 with the General Peace 
Agreement. In Brazil, a series of governments after redemocratisation surfed the wave 
of neoliberal globalisation and prioritised the country’s relationship with the developed 




two important initiatives towards Mozambique by the Brazilian governments in the 1990s: 
(a) for two years (1993 and 1994), the United Nations Operation in Mozambique 
(ONUMOZ) received great contribution from the Brazilian Army to carry out 
peacekeeping initiatives in the country and (b) the creation of the Community of 
Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) indicated the country’s interest in intensifying 
its relations with those nations, notably Mozambique (Pereira & Tatim, 2017:23). 
As previously discussed, cooperation for development is portrayed as an 
alternative to previous approaches adopted by Brazil in its international insertion (Pereira 
& Tatim, 2017:12). The legitimisation of the country’s SSDC in Mozambique, as in Africa 
more broadly, is justified through, firstly, vast presidential diplomacy. Lula visited the 
country three times during his time in office, while Brazil received three official visits from 
Mozambican presidents in the same period. During these occasions, several 
commitments in the realm of development cooperation were made (de Almeida & 
Kraychete, 2013:341). Secondly, Brazil’s image as a reliable and desirable partner for 
Mozambique was constructed upon discourses of demand-driven cooperation, devoid of 
economic conditions, commercial interests and political interference in Mozambique. 
Moreover, Brazil also used the concepts of “solidarity”, “moral debt” – because of the 
historical link of slavery –, “geographical proximity – due to similar tropical climate – as 
well as “cultural proximity” in its approach to the country (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 
2017:3). Besides cooperation, 95 per cent of the Mozambican debt to Brazil was 
pardoned in 2004, an amount estimated at US$351 million (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 
2017:4; Pereira & Tatim, 2017:19). 
 
3.3.1. Technical cooperation 
In 2010, 55 per cent per cent of the Brazilian technical cooperation in Africa went 
to the PALOP, or Portuguese-Speaking countries (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2), 
with Mozambique as a key partner, receiving alone 81 per cent of the technical 
cooperation budget destined towards the African continent (Ridderbusch, 2018:45). By 
2011, the country had 21 cooperation projects under execution and nine others being 
negotiated under the flag of Brazilian cooperation for development (Avelhan, 2015:8). 
The main areas of cooperation were agriculture, health and education. While a variety of 
projects could be mentioned here to illustrate Brazil’s initiatives in Mozambique, this 
section will focus on two emblematic cases that, alone, epitomise the fundamental 
features of Brazilian cooperation for development in the country. For this purpose, the 
ProSavana and the antiretroviral (ARV) factory in Matola are going to be examined.  
In 2011, 75 per cent of the Mozambican population lived in rural areas and relied 




25 million people (Avelhan, 2015:8). The importance of the agricultural sector for 
Mozambique’s economy and its potential for growth sparked Brazil’s interest in fostering 
development cooperation projects in the field. Mozambique is one of only two African 
countries (alongside Ghana) to host the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(Embrapa)24, receiving the highest number of researchers from that cooperating 
institution in the continent (Chichava et al, 2013:9). Embrapa is also involved in the 
research component of ABC’s largest and most innovative project for agricultural 
development in Mozambique, the ProSavana.  
Considered Brazil’s largest agricultural cooperation project in Africa, ProSavana 
has an expected budget of US$36.2 millions and was created through the triangular 
cooperation between the Brazilian, Japanese and Mozambican governments. It was 
formulated with the goal of developing agricultural production in the Nacala Corridor, 
north Mozambique, by engaging private investors to promote sustainable agricultural 
production and poverty reduction (Avelhan, 2015:11). By directly supporting 400 million 
small and medium farmers in that region, the project aimed to enhance both the national 
level of food security and the competitiveness of Mozambican agriculture internationally 
(Avelhan, 2015:11).  
 Much like other cooperation projects initiated by Brazil in Mozambique, 
ProSavana emulated a successful domestic story, that of the Brazilian Cerrado. Between 
the 1970s and the 1990s, a cooperation project between the Brazilian government and 
the Japanese government enhanced agricultural development in the area and increased 
the production of food (Ridderbusch, 2018:45). The similarities with the Savannah area 
in Mozambique and the Brazilian experience of “pioneering farmers from a sparsely-
populated bush zone into one of the world’s most important regions of export-oriented 
agricultural production” (Shankland & Gonçalves, 2016:36) inspired the triangular 
cooperation project.  
The ProSavana, however, did not come without issues. The project was 
subjected to increasing and legitimate contestation from Brazilian and Mozambican 
scholars and actors of the civil society over allegations of land grabbing and disregard 
for local communities, among others (Avelhan, 2015:15). Acting alongside several SSDC 
initiatives, Brazilian private companies also benefited from ProSavana. Brazil’s mining 
company Vale found in the project an opportunity to link its mining activities in the Nacala 
Corridor to the agricultural project (Ridderbusch, 2018:48). 
 
24 “Embrapa was created in 1973 as an agricultural research organization under Brazil’s Ministry 
of Agriculture and was almost entirely funded by government resources. Pursuing a clear vision 
of recuperating and boosting the agricultural sector, Embrapa has developed and transferred 





Beyond agriculture, the majority of the projects of technical cooperation executed 
in Mozambique speak to important themes advocated by Brazil in intergovernmental 
organisations such as the United Nations. An example is the emphasis on the fight 
against HIV/AIDS and hunger (de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013:362). With regards to the 
HIV/AIDS agenda, Mozambique is the only country in Africa to hold a factory 
manufacturing antiretroviral (ARV), funded and built by Brazil. As with the ProSavana, 
the ARV factory was inspired by the success of the fight against HIV/AID in Brazil. The 
project aimed to establish the first and only publicly-owned pharmaceutical factory in 
Sub-Saharan region. By 2014, costs for the construction of the factory were estimated 
at US$34.6 million, mostly funded by the Brazilian government, but with a significant 
contribution of US$8.5 million from the Mozambican government. The Brazilian Vale 
donated an extra US$4.5 million to the project (Russo et al, 2014).  
 “ProSavana, More Food Africa25 and the Food Acquisition Programme26 are all 
examples of cooperation programmes aiming to reproduce in Africa Brazil’s own policy 
experiments with agricultural development, for which claims of domestic success have 
been made” (Chichava et al, 2013:9). The same can be said about Brazil’s health 
cooperation. Fundamentally, Brazil’s SSDC is informed by the belief that successful 
national experiences with development could be exported and replicated in Africa 
(Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:3). The international projection of the Brazilian state – 
and its central role in the national development project – also reflects on the several 
cooperation projects which attempts to enhance the institutional capacity of the 
Mozambican state (de Almeida & Kraychete, 2013:365) 
 On the other hand, ProSavana and the ARV factory encapsulate the interplay 
between development cooperation and the advancement of Brazil enterprises and their 
interests, which will be the focus of the next section. 
 
3.3.2. Trade and the internationalisation of Brazil’s “national champions” 
 Brazil’s development cooperation initiatives in Mozambique also demonstrate the 
pragmatic side of Brazilian foreign policy under Lula. While Lula’s national development 
programme and its social policies were internationally projected to expand the country’s 
influence in the Global South within the realm of South-South Development Cooperation, 
 
25 More Food International (MFI) is a development cooperation programme that emulates Brazil’s 
More Food Program. The initiative aims at “strengthening the productive capacity of smallholder 
farmers in African countries, who are claimed to bear a resemblance to Brazil’s family farmers.” 
(Cabral et al, 2016:47) 
26 Inspired in a Brazilian initiative and “exported” to the African country, “it aims to ensure that 
populations suffering from food and nutritional insecurity have access to food, and to promote 




the government also supported the internationalisation of Brazilian companies 
(Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:683).  
For some, “Brazilian business perceived the potential of the Mozambican market, 
while Mozambique saw in the Brazilian partnership a chance to make its projects 
possible without the political costs traditionally imposed by Western powers” (Pereira & 
Tatim, 2017:23). Between 2003 and 2011, ties forged between Mozambique and Brazil 
through development cooperation initiatives resulted in an expansion of trade and 
investments flows between the two countries. Trade between Brazil and Mozambique 
increased from US$4 billion in 2003 to US$20 in 2010 (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:2). 
As for FDI flows from Brazil to Mozambique, major Brazilian companies have 
operations in the African country in the fields of mining, energy and engineering. The 
internationalisation of Brazilian private companies was mostly funded by Brazil’s National 
Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES), especially during Lula’s 
administration and particular attention was paid to the so-called “national champions”, 
especially mining and engineering-construction companies such as Vale and Odebrecht, 
both in Mozambique.   
The world’s second largest mining company, Brazil’s Vale is responsible for the 
operations of one of the largest Brazilian investments in Mozambique, the Moatize coal 
mining in Tete Province (Chichava, Alves & Alden, 2017:4). Moreover, large Brazilian 
construction companies such as Odebrecht, Camargo Corrêa and Antonio Gutierrez, are 
involved in infrastructure building such as mining sites, dams, roads and airport 
(Chichava et al, 2013:8). In this context, Mozambique features once again as a relevant 
study case of Brazil’s SSDC and its nuances. . 
 
3.4. Concluding remarks 
Brazilian SSDC agenda in Africa was shaped by the existing international 
dynamics and a plurality of domestic actors with diverse interests and motivations. 
Presidential diplomacy, party diplomacy, government coalition, the “progressive” wing 
within Itamaraty and, not least important, the changing dynamics of Brazilian race 
relations are all manifested in the country’s global ambitions, serving and being served 
by the national developmental experience during that period. The formulation of Brazil’s 
South-South Development Cooperation agenda was, from the beginning, informed by 
the synchrony between the national model of development and Brazil’s global ambitions. 
In other words, Brazil’s impressive levels of development could be emulated in other 
developing countries (under the banner of SSDC) and it could have provided the country 




In Brazil’s impressive economic growth, Lula saw a window of opportunity to 
implement a state-led model of development that responded to the social challenges of 
the Brazilian society. Globally acclaimed initiatives aimed at inter alia, tackling extreme 
poverty and income inequality, gave shape to the country’s SSDC initiatives. At the same 
time, Lula’s national project was also characterised by strong synergies between public 
and private business interests. By advancing development cooperation initiatives in the 
developing world, Brazil paved the way for the internationalisation of its “national 
champions”, or large Brazilian enterprises, which were heavily funded by the Brazilian 
Development Bank (BNDES). De Castro (2013:248) summarises Brazilian strategy 
under Lula as one in which “political dialogue, technical cooperation, investment, and 
trade became complementary elements in Brazil-Africa relations”.  
Mozambique encapsulates all aspects of Brazil’s South-South Development 
Cooperation outlined before. Several successful Brazilian projects and policies were 
“exported” to Mozambique through development cooperation initiatives. Investments in 
the Mozambican agricultural sector, with ProSavana, emulated the experience of the 
Brazilian Cerrado, which had enhanced Brazil’s productivity and competitiveness in the 
field. Similarly, the Brazil-funded construction of a public ARV factory in Matola was 
inspired by the successful story of the fight against HIV/AIDS at home. In short, the 
projects were aimed at the strengthening of the Mozambican state and addressed major 
social challenges. These projects also mirrored the national project with regards to the 
involvement of Brazil’s large enterprises in most of these projects, such as Vale.  
Cooperation for development in Mozambique, as in other African countries, was 
promoted under the banners of solidarity and altruism. Nonetheless, these initiatives also 
served Brazil’s economic interests and the search for political support (Leite e 
Cavalcante, 2016:358). However, as argued by many, economic interests and altruism 
are not mutually exclusive, since it does not preclude Brazil’s contributions towards the 
development of recipient countries (Leite e Cavalcante, 2016:358). Be it as it may, 
Brazil’s initiatives in Mozambique granted the necessary credentials for its leadership 
ambitions and secured the political support of a strategic African partner. 
Against this backdrop, the sustainability and consistency of Brazilian SSDC in 
Mozambique, as well as in Africa more broadly, is directly tied to the national project of 
development. The links between Brazil’s approach towards national development and its 
SSDC agenda, particularly in Africa, will dictate the changes that will be observed under 
the subsequent administrations. Faced with internal and external constraints, Brazil’s 
state-led, inclusive economic development would gradually crumble. As for SSDC in 




Chapter IV: Pulling the plug? Brazil’s Development Cooperation in 
Mozambique under Rousseff and Temer 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 After eight years as the President of Brazil, Lula left office in 2010 with an 
unprecedented approval rating of 83 per cent by the Brazilian public (Veja, 2010). The 
election of his party fellow, Dilma Rousseff, who was closely supported by Lula during 
the 2010 elections, indicated that there would be no major changes in the direction of 
Brazil’s domestic and foreign policies. The Rousseff government was expected to be an 
extension of her predecessor’s, whose progressive approach to development reflected 
in the country’s internal and external policies. 
 Despite expectations, however, Rousseff’s government would have to deal with 
the political and economic crises that began at the end of Lula’s mandate, as discussed 
in more detail later in this chapter. Brazil’s thriving economy, which had allowed for 
successful distributive and social policies, would eventually be hit by the international 
financial crisis. This posed a challenge to Brazil’s efforts towards inclusive development 
in the domestic domain and, in turn, affected its ambitious global agenda that champions 
South-South development (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:176). Domestically, the political 
setting (i.e. the ruling political coalition and an overall public approval of domestic 
policies) which sustained Brazil’s rise as an international player was now more divided 
and less conducive for pursuing such ambitions. 
Rousseff’s vice-president, Michel Temer, ascended to the country’s highest office 
in August 2016, representing a renewal in national politics, economic policies and, no 
less important, its foreign policy agenda. The Temer government redefined the 
developmental model, introducing a series of neoliberal economic reforms and austerity 
measures. Politically, Temer had to deal with the challenge of legitimising his 
government before the Brazilian society and the different power branches of Brazil’s 
political system. Even though it was a very brief government, duration did not stop 
significant changes to also happen in Brazil’s foreign policy outlook, though most of its 
manifestations are still to be seen. 
 Against this backdrop, this chapter will shed light on Brazil’s South-South 
Development Cooperation in Africa, particularly Mozambique, placing this agenda within 
the broader context of the country’s foreign policy from 2011 until 2018. A key instrument 
for achieving Brazil’s global ambitions under Lula, South-South Development 
Cooperation in Africa under Rousseff and Temer can only be understood within the 




to achieve was to understand the impact of changes in foreign policy disposition on 
Brazil’s SSDC agenda, particularly in Mozambique. Following the introduction, this 
chapter will further seek to discuss the different factors shaping the formulation of Brazil’s 
foreign policy and its impact on the country’s SSDC agenda for purposes of identifying 
the circumstances that could have led to the decision to pull the plug on South-South 
Development Cooperation. 
The two administrations in question, Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel 
Temer’s (2016-2018), will be discussed through the lens of the theoretical angle upon 
which this thesis is anchored, viz. neoclassical realism. For this reason, the international 
system – its opportunities and restrictions – will be the point of departure to understand 
the opportunities and limitations imposed by the third image on Brazil’s foreign policy 
during said period. After identifying the systemic factors that constrained the realisation 
of the country’s South-South agenda, the chapter will turn to Brazil’s domestic context. 
The domestic setting is given special attention in order to understand how international 
events were filtered through very particular domestic ones, leading to substantial 
changes in Brazil’s foreign policy. The latter and the consequences for Brazilian SSDC 
towards Africa will then be discussed, with each administration discussed separately. 
Lastly, this chapter will focus once more on the selected country case, which is 
Mozambique. The two major areas of cooperation between Brazil and Mozambique 
discussed in Chapter 3, namely health and agriculture, will be used to discuss the extent 
of changes in those sectors during Rousseff and Temer’s administrations. 
In short, the general tone of Brazil’s South-South Cooperation agenda in Africa 
and Mozambique, after Lula, changes significantly. Mozambique continued to be one of 
Brazil’s major cooperation partners in Africa. However, fewer resources and less effort 
were allocated to development cooperation by the Brazilian government, and economic 
interests prevailed over those that championed development projects. A constellation of 
external and domestic factors, such as the impact of the global economic crisis on the 
national economy and major corruption scandals involving Brazilian companies and 
Mozambican officials altered the direction of the country’s foreign policy to be less 
supportive of the country’s SSDC initiatives.  
This chapter argues that, following the Lula government, Brazil’s withdrawal from 
its South-South Development Cooperation agenda was a reflection of the new approach 
to national development (i.e. a more timid state participation in the economy, austere 
policies, and an eventual neoliberal turn under Temer), as well as its approach to 
international development (i.e. a shift towards commercial interests and the traditional 
partners of the North, and a move away from the country’s reformist ambitions). Under 




ambitions, i.e. becoming a leader of the Global South and a key cooperation partner; 
making new allies and acquiring political support to support Brazil’s demand for reform 
in the international system; fostering Brazil’s own national development. After Lula, Brazil 
gradually moved away from its global ambitions of leadership and reform, and began to 
display a more pragmatic approach – the search for short-term economic benefits. This 
movement was slow and gradual under Rousseff, but clearly intensified under Temer. 
 
4.2. International and domestic factors driving changes in Brazilian Foreign 
Policy under Rousseff and Temer 
 The impact of the international financial crisis on the developing world was 
eventually felt after the deceleration of the economies of Europe and China. After more 
than a decade of strong presence in the global economy and the political power that it 
provided, some developing countries were challenged by a more restrictive international 
system and forced to look inward to solve their own economic crises. 
In Brazil, a tighter budgetary capacity meant that the political climate became 
more challenging for the pursuit of the national developmental agenda. Moreover, the 
year of 2014 marked the beginning of the country’s farthest-reaching corruption 
investigation, which would contribute to the weakening of Rousseff’s government 
(Svartman & da Silva, 2016:7) and propelled the rise of her vice-president, Michel Temer, 
to the presidency in August 2016. As for Brazil’s foreign policy, though continuation was 
expected under Rousseff, her first foreign minister Antonio Patriota, soon announced 
upon his inauguration in office that “continuation is not repetition” (MRE, 2011a), 
signalling possible changes in foreign policy. Under Michel Temer, however, changes in 
Brazil’s foreign policy disposition were way more significant. With the narrative of ridding 
the country of its political ideologies and realigning with the traditional partners of the 
North, SSDC is no longer the priority, nor is it the tool for the realisation of Brazil’s 
international ambitions.  
In order to understand how changes in foreign policy occurred, this section will 
cast light on the external and internal factors shaping the formulation of Brazil’s 
international agenda during Rousseff and Temer. 
 
4.2.1. Changing dynamics and limited resources: the global financial crisis, South-
South Cooperation and Brazil 
  As discussed in Chapter 2, neoclassical realists’ point of departure when 
analysing a country’s foreign policy is the international system. The latter, it is argued, is 




country. The third image, or the international system, will delimit how far foreign policy 
goals can go in relation to the opportunities and restrictions in place (Rose, 1998:151).  
  Under Lula’s administrations, Brazil enjoyed a more permissive global 
environment for the economic and political claims of the developing world. The onset of 
the world financial crisis helped push emerging economies like Brazil to the centre of the 
global economic system, increasing their political relevance as a consequence. 
According to Sobrinho & Filho (2018:26), more than exposing the fragility of central 
economies such as the United States and Europe, the financial crisis also showed the 
potential of the developing world. In this context, for example, the world witnessed the 
emergence of the G20 and its central role in the world’s economic recovery, fostering 
deeper integration (Sobrinho & Filho, 2018:26). Politically, for countries like Brazil, the 
G20 was the opportunity to sit at the negotiation table with the world’s most advanced 
economies and a chance to put forward its major claims (Filho, 2018:142).  
Cooperation amongst emerging economies, then, emerged as an instrument of 
development and a way to counter-balance the centrality of more advanced economies 
and put forward claims for reform of the international architecture of power. For Brazil, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, SSDC became an instrument to achieve its own 
national development imperatives. By making new alliances and cooperating towards 
development, Brazil aimed at gathering the necessary political support to assume a 
greater role in the “setting of international norms” (de Castro, 2013:2).  
Thus, it can be argued that the government led by Lula was able to translate such 
opportunities into an ambitious foreign policy agenda, in which South-South relations 
occupied a vital place. In those circumstances, Brazil was able to establish an 
international agenda that served, in the first place, the country’s developmental goals, 
while pursuing the role of a credible leader of the Global South by strengthening ties with 
the developing world, especially via South-South Development Cooperation initiatives.  
As previously discussed, Africa was a key region for the country’s ambitious 
project. By intensifying its efforts to help African partners address the challenges of 
development, Brazil also sought to elevate its international profile and gain access to 
new markets and economic opportunities (de Oliveira, 2015:31). Needless to say, 2011 
was way different to 2003, and the inauguration of Rousseff in the presidential office 
happened amid a challenging international scenario, which will restrain the continuation 
of Brazil’s long-term project of international prominent. The world financial crisis will 
begin to affect the emerging economies and challenge both their recently-achieved 
position as global players and their efforts to integrate.  
The economic meltdown affected the developing world more intensively after 




the G7 over the prominent role played by the G20 in the first years after the outbreak of 
the crisis. An example of the economic and political consequences of this shifting reality 
is the unsuccessful negotiations of the Doha Rounds before the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) (Saraiva, 2014:26).  
 Another significant change regards the declining prices of commodities worldwide 
as a consequence of, among other factors, decline in demand for primary products from 
China (Saraiva, 2014:26). Under Lula, China featured as one of the major drivers of 
Brazil’s economic growth via commodity exports to the Chinese market. While China 
imported mainly primary products from Brazil, it also promoted the exports of 
manufactured goods from Brazil to South American partners, who also enjoyed a boom 
in their international reserves. However, this trend was interrupted by the European 
recession from 2010 onwards, as well as America’s protectionist economic policies, 
which negatively affected China’s economic growth. The slowdown in Chinese exports 
led to a decrease in commodity prices by 40 per cent between 2011 and 2015, ending 
the boom years of 2004 to 2011 (Neto & Tussie, 2018:337).   
 These factors, notwithstanding their political consequences in different regions of 
the world, characterise the period between 2008 and 2015 as one with deep changes in 
the global economic architecture, in which the available alternatives for action became 
very limited, particularly for the emerging countries (Neto & Tussie, 2018:338). In Brazil, 
this restrictive scenario posed a challenge on the country’s model of economic growth, 
which is highly dependent on the export of primary goods. The effects on Brazilian 
economy were significant, which will be discussed in the next section, and its 
consequences in the social and political arenas pushed for a revamped foreign policy 
agenda under the presidencies of Dilma Rousseff, and subsequently, Michel Temer (da 
Silva & Pérez, 2019:176,181).  
Limited by restrictions in resources domestically and low perspectives of 
improvement in the short run, Brazil’s scope of action in the international stage was 
significantly affected (Cornetet, 2014:138).  Furthermore, the “model of development” 
that once provided the necessary credentials for the country to consolidate its desired 
goal of a leader of the Global South now shows its flaws and unsustainable 
characteristics through pessimistic accounts of the country’s future. On the other hand, 
SSDC – which had become Brazil’s primary tool of national development and global 
acquisition of political support – is reshaped to exhibit more pragmatic features in search 
of short-term benefits and return of investments that could help with the recovery of the 
Brazilian economy.   
 While Rousseff’s government did not characterise significant change in Brazil’s 




impetus), Temer symbolised greater retraction in Brazil’s SSDC agenda by promoting 
the reorientation of Brazilian international agenda towards the North-South axis, to the 
detriment of the close relationship that had been established with the Global South (Actis, 
2017:1). Nevertheless, the President’s efforts to advance his liberal agenda and bring 
Brazil closer to its “traditional partners of the North”, particularly the United States, was 
frustrated by the electoral victory of Donald Trump in 2016 (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:181) 
In this context, though Brazil’s agenda for SSDC in Africa remains an important 
part of the country`s international agenda, it will be reframed to incorporate a more 
commercial tone (Leite & Cavalcante, 2016:364). These changes will characterise 
Rousseff and Temer’s responses, on the one hand, to the limitations imposed by the 
reality outside borders, and on the other, to the country’s domestic setting, which will be 
discussed later in the next section. 
  
4.2.2. Domestic factors and Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation in 
Africa 
 Some scholars and foreign policy analysts will argue that, more than the domestic 
dynamics, the international ones will be the primary factor driving change in Brazil’s 
foreign policy (Malamud, 2012:121). However, though international circumstances ought 
to be the point of departure to understand Brazil’s rollback in SSDC practices, particularly 
in Africa, no account can be complete without careful examination of particular domestic 
factors shaping the country’s international approach. This is mostly true during the 
timeframe in question (2011-2018), where political and economic crises dominated the 
realm of domestic politics. For this reason, scholars such as Cervo & Lessa (2014:149) 
will argue that the decline in Brazil’s global ambitions experienced under Rousseff, and 
furthered under Temer, is consequence of domestic factors rather than international 
ones. 
Challenged by global economic shocks, Brazil’s economy began to experience a 
slowdown. Export growth rates fell to 1.6 per cent in the years between 2011 and 2014 
in comparison to the yearly average 5.2 per cent between 2004 and 2010, and the 
country’s GDP also suffered a massive decrease of 7.4 per cent from 2010 to 2014, 
when it was only 0.1 per cent. This sharp decline in Brazil’s GDP, coupled with the 
collapse of investments and a growing unemployment rate posed significant constraints 
to the government’s actions domestically and internationally (da Silva & Pérez, 
2019:177). Besides the economic crisis, post-Lula Brazil underwent a series of significant 
events that will deeply affect national politics, i.e. international sportive events, large 
corruption scandals, an impeachment and the dismantling of the developmental coalition 




Brazil’s global prominence since the 1990s conferred the country the opportunity 
to host the FIFA World Cup in 2014 and the Olympic Games in 2016. These prestigious 
international events kept Brazil in the spotlight after the Lula era, yet they did not happen 
without serious contestations from various quarters of Brazilian society. In June 2013, 
thousands of Brazilians took to the streets in one of the largest public demonstrations 
never seen before in the last 20 years (Watts, 2013b).  Sparked by the government’s 
decision to increase bus fares, the protests evolved to include deeper objections over 
the government’s escalating expenditure on the sporting events, increasing 
unemployment levels, poor service delivery and endemic corruption (Watts, 2013a). 
 This scenario of internal dispute and the government’s fading legitimacy in the 
public’s eyes did not stop Rousseff from being re-elected for a second term in office in 
2014. However, the consequences of the economic crisis forced the government to adopt 
unpopular austerity measures, leading to objections by civil society and popular 
movements, which resulted in the weakening of her support base (Svartman & da Silva, 
2016:7).  
 Rousseff’s diminishing support is also reflected in the president’s relationship with 
its political support basis in Congress, where a weakened coalition offered a less solid 
support than that enjoyed by her predecessor (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:175) While no 
major international projects related to foreign policy issued were vetoed in parliament 
during her two administrations, some authors point towards some deterioration in the 
relationship between the President and her own support base, or coalition (Ribeiro, 
2018:58). Milani (2015:70) reiterates that in times of budgetary constraints and 
distributive conflicts, members of the Brazilian legislative will mobilise against themes of 
foreign policy that are deemed controversial.  Thus, the legislative house became a stage 
where contested views of Brazil’s foreign policy agenda were exposed, reflecting 
somehow their feelings towards SSDC.  
The following was said by a member of the opposition in the National Congress, 
and illustrates the divergent opinions on the foreign policy instruments used by the 
governments of PT, and mostly, Lula: “This government has been prodigy in using the 
money of Brazilian citizens and workers, deposited onto BNDES [Brazilian Development 
Bank], to finance projects based on the president’s lunatic dream of world leadership and 
to finance projects of dictators (…). In other words, all the Brazilian citizens’ money is 
applied, by the federal administration, in other countries, which will fail to pay us back. 
(…) it has, in fact, a humanitarian essence, but it serves, above all, the political interests 
of the president in doing wrong foreign policy” (Brasil, 2018 in Ribeiro, 2018:68). 
 Far from being a major decisive factor in terms of foreign policy formulation under 




SSDC initiatives that were consolidated under Lula. For Cervo & Lessa (2014:149), the 
weakening of the dialogue between different sectors of Brazilian society and the 
executive power, as well as the loss of leadership capacity of the Brazilian state are the 
major causes of Brazil’s declining international presence under Rousseff’s 
administrations.  
To make matters worse, 2014 marked the beginning of Operation Car Wash, 
which would uninterruptedly denounce cases of corruption involving major political 
parties, especially those that made up Rousseff’s ruling coalition. The Operation, which 
would later be called one of the biggest corruption investigations in world history, 
exposed not only government officials (including former president Lula himself), but also 
jailed dozens of leaders from some of Brazil’s major private companies (da Silva & Pérez, 
2019:178). While the corruption scandal inflicted serious damage to the Workers’ Party’s 
image domestically, it also challenged the legitimacy of the government internationally, 
as well as the internationalisation of its “national champions”, most of them involved in 
international bribery schemes.  
The deterioration of the image of the President’s political party led to another 
wave of protests in March 2015, where thousands took to the streets calling for the 
impeachment of Rousseff, though the President herself had not been accused or 
criminalised by the investigations (Douglas, 2015). This, in turn, paved the way for the 
undemocratic process of impeachment in the Brazilian Congress, after both the ruling 
coalition and the private sector dismissed its support for Rousseff (da Silva & Pérez, 
2019:178).  
Faced with a hostile Congress and diminishing support from the public, her 
democratic mandate would be eventually interrupted by the parliamentary coup d’état 
that impeached the President in August 2016 (Cavalcanti & Venerio, 2017:145). Dilma 
Rousseff was impeached due to contested accusations of using improper loans from 
public banks for the national budget without Congress approval (da Silva & Pérez, 
2019:178). Though improper administrative actions were used as the basis for the 
impeachment, the political motivation for the coup is linked to the president’s refusal to 
stop Operation Car Wash investigations, aimed at investigating a money laundering 
scheme involving Brazil`s majority-state-owned oil company Petrobras, and other 
national champions as well as politicians (Watts, 2016). 
As the new president of Brazil, Michel Temer faced numerous challenges to 
respond to the economic challenges and the public’s grievances. Above all, the 
legitimacy of his government was always a bone of contention to advance the new 




In his short term in office, Temer enjoyed a more solid support base in Parliament 
and was able to advance a series of economic reforms to reverse Brazil’s dire economic 
circumstances. With a more neoliberal approach, the President executed significant cuts 
in government spending, including those allocated to social programmes that reduced 
inequality during Lula’s years in office. As da Silva & Pérez (2019:180), “the proposals 
(…) [were] met with great resistance from a population accustomed to high levels of 
government spending since the Lula years”. With insignificant implications on the 
economy, and faced with corruption charges in 2017, Temer left office as the most 
unpopular president in the history of Brazil, with an approval rating of only 3 per cent. 
  
 
4.3. Rousseff’s and Temer’s foreign policy and South-South Development 
Cooperation Initiatives in Africa: pulling the plug 
 Along with South America, Africa is where the changes in Brazil’s SSDC 
approach were felt the most. Though numerous factors from Africa’s perspective could 
also be used to understand such changes, the combination of international and national 
events between 2011 and 2018 affected Brazil’s foreign policy in Africa in three major 
ways. Firstly, under major economic crisis and budgetary restrictions, there was 
increasing contestation by parts of Brazilian society over the allocation of public funds 
towards development cooperation in other countries, especially in times of austerity. Not 
only did Brazil’s exports to the continent decrease from US$12 billion in 2011 to US$9.7 
billion in 2014, but cooperation projects in Africa implemented by Itamaraty’s ABC also 
decreased from 253 to 161 in 2015. (Chichava, 2017:382) 
Secondly, Temer`s assault on the supposedly ideological underpinnings of 
Brazilian foreign policy, or the “Lula Agenda”, compromised the nature and longevity of 
Brazil`s SSDC agenda in Africa. By prioritising economic interests over long-term political 
alliances, Rousseff and Temer, the latter more intensively, distanced themselves from 
the narrative of inclusive development and democratisation of the international system. 
Lula`s international agenda was not devoid of economic interests, but these did not 
undermine the development of an altruist attitude with regards to South-South relations. 
Furthermore, cooperation for development, especially in Africa, had served as an anchor 
to Lula`s reformist ambitions and the consolidation of its desirable leadership in the 
Global South. This change in narrative, coupled with the declining credibility of Brazil`s 
initiatives in Mozambique, represented significant changes in the relationship between 
Brazil and Mozambique, though the latter`s position as the most important African 




  Thirdly, Operation Car Wash, which saw several business leaders of the “national 
champions” sent to jail, also compromised the model of development cooperation also 
within the realm of Brazil’s private sector. Large Brazilian companies, whose initiatives 
to venture into Africa had been financed by BNDES (such as construction companies 
Odebrecht, Andrade Gutierrez and Camargo Corrêa) were accused – following the 
outcomes of Operation Car Wash – of corruption and bribes in exchange for favours to 
obtain international contracts. This process led to an eventual suspension of BNDES 
funds for these companies’ projects (Chichava, 2017:382). Additionally, the involvement 
of many African government officials was also unveiled by the Operation, as is the case 
of Mozambique, to be discussed later in this chapter. These large corruption scandals27 
deeply affected the legitimacy of Brazil in the eyes of Mozambican civil society, 
diminishing support for the presence of Brazilian enterprises in the country.  
If under Lula Brazil dedicated an increasing amount of its budget towards SSDC 
initiatives via, for instance, the export of successful public policies and technical skills, 
under Rousseff and Temer, Brazil showed a declining capacity to allocate resources 
towards cooperation for development. Furthermore, the parsimonious approach towards 
SSDC commitments as shown by Rousseff and Temer’s presidencies triggered another 
chain reaction which resulted in Brazil becoming less enthusiastic about the possibility 
of diversifying her international partners (Neto & Tussie, 2018: 352).  
 
4.3.1. Dilma Rousseff’s foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation 
in Africa 
Rousseff’s agenda for Africa remained very similar to the one implemented by 
Lula, though differences of personal, domestic and international levels gave it a less 
active and innovative character (Burges & Bastos, 2017). In the main, two main 
differences can be observed in Rousseff’s approach to Africa and SSDC in comparison 
to Lula: (a) a less intense presidential diplomacy and, (b) the prioritisation of short-term 
economic gains over the government of Lula’s long-term developmental goals. 
With regards to presidential diplomacy, the personalisation of Brazil and Africa 
relations in the image of Lula originates from the latter’s promotion of closer ties with the 
African continent as never experienced before. Rousseff’s less active presidential 
diplomacy led many scholars and analysts to attribute Brazil’s reduced international 
prominence solely to her personal characteristics and leadership style. In fact, Rousseff 
was different to her predecessor in several ways, which may have resulted in a different 
approach to management, described by Cornetet (2014:132) as “more practical and 
 
27 As for the corruption practices by the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht, it was called “the largest 




technical” rather than Lula’s “charismatic” profile.  Rousseff was criticised by Brazilian 
diplomats and businessmen alike for “weakening Brazil-Africa relations” (IBRAF, 
2018:1). 
However, as argued by Bastos & Hiratuka (2017:12), it is unlikely that Rousseff 
would have been able to reverse Brazil’s declining visibility and international presence 
had she been fonder of presidential diplomacy, once most of its causes originated from 
unfavourable international circumstances, as well as national ones. Under Rousseff, the 
combination of challenging domestic and international factors resulted in efforts being 
channelled towards acting upon Brazil’s economic and political crisis.  
The slowdown of the Brazilian economy led to major cuts in the budget allocated 
to the Foreign Ministry and, consequently, its cooperation agency ABC. Between 2011 
and 2013, Brazil allocated R$3.2 billion to development cooperation projects, a decrease 
of 11.5 per cent in comparison with the period between 2008 and 2010 (Neto & Tussie, 
2018:352). According to Lechini (2018:418), Rousseff`s government substantially 
reduced ABC`s budget and the incentives for cooperation projects by prioritising existing 
ones over the creation of new ones. As said by ABC`s Africa, Asia and Oceania 
department coordinator at the time, budget cuts amounted to 70 per cent only during 
Rousseff`s first year in office (Lechini, 2018:418). Rousseff’s foreign policy begin to 
prioritise short-term benefits over what Saraiva (2014:27) calls “diffused gains” in Brazil’s 
international agenda (Saraiva, 2014:27). 
As a response to the accusations of “neglecting Africa”, Rousseff reiterated the 
enduring importance of the continent in Brazil`s foreign policy agenda by launching 
Grupo África, a group comprising different national ministries whose objectives were to 
redefine Brazil`s policy towards Africa. In order to strengthen relations with the continent, 
the new agenda sought to connect Brazilian investments and trade to development 
cooperation projects in Africa (de Oliveira, 2015:35).  
In 2013, Agenda África was launched with the main goals of pardoning African 
countries’ debt to Brazil, negotiating investment and trade agreements and broadening 
cooperation projects (Lechini, 2018:417). Also in 2013, Brazil pardoned or negotiated a 
total of US$900 million in debt from twelve African countries. Though in line with her 
predecessor’s policy of debt relief, this action was announced by Rousseff in a more 
pragmatic tone in comparison to Lula and Amorim’s “historic debt” and “solidarity” 
approach. Rousseff described it as a necessary measure to promote increased Brazilian 
investments, internationalisation of Brazilian companies and trade with the African 





Thus, economic issues become key not only in the domestic sphere, but in the 
country’s external policies (Saraiva, 2014:27). As a consequence of this, insofar as 
Brazil-Africa relations are concerned, Rousseff’s government emphasised the economic 
benefits that could be accrued from closer ties with the African continent (Abdenur & 
Marcondes, 2018:178), which can be understood as a tipping point for kicking-off a new 
agenda for Africa. In striking contrast to the expectations about the pursuit of an assertive 
approach towards human rights under Rousseff – due mainly to the president’s own 
history as a militant and a victim of torture by the Brazilian military dictatorship – Brazil’s 
priorities seemed to be concentrated on the economic and commercial aspects (Abdenur 
& Neto, 2013:22), pushing the human rights agenda and SSDC away. 
Leite & Cavalcante (2016:364) will argue that, while Lula’s cooperation for Africa 
was closely advanced through presidential diplomacy, Rousseff’s cooperation for Africa 
was one executed through commercial diplomacy. These changes signified a decrease 
in presidential diplomacy and cooperation for development, but they did not alter Africa’s 
position as a key partner in Brazil’s international agenda (de Oliveira, 2015:42).  
Brazil`s new approach towards the continent is a function of the economic 
challenges posed by the global economy and the bearing it had on domestic politics. 
Maintaining the country`s alliances with the Global South was still seen as a priority by 
the Brazilian government under Rousseff, in part due to the party`s political convictions 
about the undemocratic international system. However, the president`s reduced 
enthusiasm for matters of international politics meant that the motivations behind the 
country`s SSDC agenda were slowly abandoned. This rollback of the country’s 
international development projects would be intensified under Michel Temer, as 
discussed in the next section. 
 
4.3.2. Michel Temer’s foreign policy and South-South Development Cooperation in 
Africa  
 When Temer took office in 2016, his appointed foreign ministry José Serra 
announced the launch of a “New Brazilian Foreign Policy”, in which there would 
supposedly be the execution of a non-ideological agenda and the reorientation of Brazil’s 
international relations towards traditional partners in the North (Nunes & Rodriguez, 
2017:31). As a reflection of Temer’s domestic policies, Brazilian foreign policy would 
envisage commercial policies over political ones, as well as bilateral relations over 
multilateral ones, resulting in what Nunes & Rodriguez (2017:37) called “political 
retraction and economic pragmatism”. Thus, while Rousseff’s international agenda had 
already presented some changes in relation to previous decade, Temer’s seemed to 




 The very short duration of Temer’s government and the several political and 
economic challenges his government faced limited diplomatic capabilities (Stuenkel, 
2017:2). While drastic changes did not happen, partly due to the contestation of part of 
Itamaraty’s diplomatic corps (Silva, 2019:35), there were some significant changes in 
foreign policy disposition when compared to the 14 years of the Workers’ Party 
government. Under Temer, Brazil abandoned its claims for the reform of international 
organisations and its developmental approach (Oliveira, 2018:303). Instead, it sought to 
return investments to the country by recovering Brazil’s international legitimacy as an 
“economically and politically responsible” country (Silva, 2019:34), a movement that 
reached its most symbolic point upon Temer’s submission of formal request to become 
a permanent member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 2017. 
 Brazil’s SSDC agenda did not disappear completely from Temer’s agenda, 
though his government was deeply disapproved by some countries from the Global 
South due to his support for Rousseff’s impeachment process. This illegitimacy in the 
eyes of some of Brazil’s major partners in the developing world made it difficult for the 
continuation of the South-South agenda, crafted by the Workers’ Party, to find its place 
in Temer’s Brazil (da Silva & Pérez, 2019:179). At the same time, Temer’s efforts to 
dissociate from his predecessors’ policies entailed revising the criteria for choosing the 
country’s international alliances (Oliveira, 2018:301). 
 As for Brazil and Africa relations, foreign minister Serra’s inauguration speech in 
2016 indicated that the economic pragmatism – which underpinned Rousseff’s policy 
agenda – would be the main guiding principle, in stark contrast to the solidarity rhetoric 
that defined Brazil’s SSDC approach in the Lula years. According to Serra, “contrary to 
what was promoted, the Africa of today does not ask for sympathy but hopes for an 
effective technological and investment exchange. Pragmatic solidarity towards countries 
of the global South will continue to be an important strategy of Brazil’s foreign policy. 
This is the right South–South strategy and not the one that was practised for publicity 
purposes with low economic benefits and high diplomatic investments” (MRE, 2017 cited 
Marcondes & Mawdsley, 2017:695). 
 Brazil’s efforts to make a pro-business approach an integral cog of its SSDC 
agenda, particularly towards Africa, reflected Temer’s attempt to eliminate what the 
government called “ideological” underpinnings of the Workers’ Party’s foreign policy. 
Lula and Rousseff’s foreign policy, which mirrored the national project of inclusive 
development, was repeatedly linked to the idea of a “failed” and “corrupt” government, 





As for SSDC, rather than eliminating these practices and risk deteriorate Brazil’s 
already diminishing image as a global player in the international stage, efforts were put 
in place to change the nature and objectives of such initiatives, which will be clearly 
illustrated in the case of Mozambique.  
 
4.4. Mozambique: from economic partner to development cooperation partner 
and back 
  As discussed before, Mozambique is arguably a key case study to understand 
Brazil’s agenda of development cooperation, particularly towards Africa. Considered the 
largest recipient of Brazilian development cooperation budget on the African continent 
under the three administrations in question, Mozambique is also one of the main African 
destinations for Brazilian exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) alike. As for Brazil’s 
rollback as Africa’s development cooperation partner from 2011 onwards, Chichava 
(2017:383) argues that Mozambique continues to be an emblematic case to understand 
the impact of the political and economic crises that characterised the post-Lula era. The 
relationship between both Portuguese-speaking countries also fairly illustrates the 
complexity of the dynamics of Brazil’s SSDC agency, its controversies and questionable 
sustainability.  
 The strengthening of Brazil and Mozambique relations throughout the eight years 
of Lula in power placed the African country at the centre of Brazil’s African agenda and 
SSDC. Rousseff’s visit to Maputo in October 2011, her first year as president, signified 
interest to have ties between the two countries maintained. Official documents signed 
during the visit expressed the countries’ intention to maintain efforts towards 
development cooperation and reiterated the importance of South-South solidarity as an 
instrument to achieve some of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (MRE, 
2011b). However, the following years would demonstrate that changes in the Brazilian 
approach towards development cooperation and, later on, in the level of importance 
given to South-South relations more broadly, also affected its major African partner, 
Mozambique.  
 Lula’s active diplomacy towards Mozambique worked hand-in-hand with Brazil’s 
cooperation for development and search for political alliances. Between 2003 and 2010, 
Lula visited the country three times and received three visits from Mozambican 
presidents. During the course of Rousseff’s and Temer’s administrations, Brazil’s visits 
to Africa were pragmatically chosen, once the presidents visited Africa’s most important 
economic partners for Brazil (de Castro, 2013:4), which included Mozambique. 
This decrease in the intensity of presidential diplomacy when compared to Lula’s 




challenges and government spending cuts. Under Rousseff, for example, Brazil reached 
the height of its political and economic turbulences caused by the decline in GDP and 
FDIs, rising inflation and unemployment levels, and Operation Car Wash scandal 
(Chichava, 2017:382). Notwithstanding the economic circumstances in place, previously 
mentioned, Rousseff shallow engagement with presidential diplomacy also points 
towards the argument that she pursued a less active international agenda, driven by 
personality traits and different priorities.  
 In 2011, the number of Brazilian cooperation projects being implemented in 
Mozambique amounted to 21, with 9 others under negotiation (Chichava, 2017:383). 
During Rousseff’s government, several of these projects were delayed or even cancelled 
as a result of lower budget allocation to federal agencies responsible for development 
cooperation. ProSavana, for example, was highly compromised by Brazil’s significant 
withdrawal from its implementation, which left the bulk of the responsibility to Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Chichava, 2017: 386). In this respect, 
Chichava (2017:386) also argues that most projects which survived the Brazilian 
withdrawal were those with a trilateral setup, in which the Brazilian actors contributed 
mostly towards technical expertise and training (Chichava, 2017:387). 
The most recent report done by the Brazilian Institute for Applied Economic 
Research (Ipea) on the country’s cooperation for international development show that, 
although Mozambique remained the largest recipient of Brazil’s cooperation between 
2014 and 2016, the budget allocated decreased significantly. In 2016, the Brazilian 
government spent just over R$8 million in bilateral cooperation with the African country, 
a sharp decline compared to the R$42.7 million it spent in 2014 financial year (Lima, 
Viana & Júnior, 2018:273) At the end of Rousseff’s government, 40 technical cooperation 
projects were on course, maintaining Mozambique’s position as the main partner for 
cooperation in the continent (Chichava, 2017:385). However, key federal agencies that 
are responsible for executing SSDC projects in Mozambique had its budget reduced in 
the same period. Between 2014 and 2016, Embrapa’s expenditure with cooperation 
projects falling sharply from R$61 million to R$21 million, which is a reduction of 35 per 
cent. In the same period, Fiocruz also saw a reduction of 46 per cent in its international 
cooperation budget (Lima,  Viana & Júnior, 2018:268). 
No data exists to account for Brazil’s SSDC commitments after 2016, but 
domestic contestations over the international cooperation agenda is reflected in some of 
the Brazilian government’s decisions after 2016. In August of that year, Temer’s 
government withdrew the offer to donate three military aircraft to the Mozambican air 
force, over claims of excessive bureaucracy. The donation had been proposed by Brazil 




(Chichava, 2017:387). In a similar trend, the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Minister declared, 
in 2018, that the country would insist that Mozambique pay back the loans used to 
finance activities of Brazilian companies in the country, which had been defaulted by the 
Mozambican government (Marcello, 2018). 
Nonetheless, some important cooperation projects were executed in 
Mozambique during the period. The antiretroviral factory funded by the Brazilian 
government was launched 2012 and the first Breast Milk Bank of Mozambique, which 
followed the successful Brazilian experience, was opened in 2018 (Fiocruz, 2018). 
However, both health cooperation projects had been negotiated under the presidency of 
Lula and, although it represents continuation of the government’s SSDC agenda, it does 
not characterise intensification or strengthening of Brazil-Mozambique relations. Rather, 
it illustrates the tendency to execute projects that had been previously negotiated 
(Lechini, 2018:418). 
The move away from Lula’s “solidarity” diplomacy is also identified in Brazil-
Mozambique relations during the period in question. In order to reduce the barriers for 
the expansion of Brazilian private businesses on the African country, Brazil and 
Mozambique signed the Brazil-Mozambique Cooperation and Investment Facilitation 
Agreement (CIFA) in 2015. The agreement aimed to facilitate the internationalisation of 
Brazilian companies in the country, offering greater security for investors, increase in 
Brazilian exports and promoting the integration of industrial production between the 
countries (Fernandes & Fiorati, 2015:248; Nogueira et al, 2017:222). The agreement, 
above all, illustrates the economic pragmatism adopted by the Brazilian government with 
regards to its relationship with the African continent and, most particularly, its largest 
cooperation partner on the continent, Mozambique. 
However, contestations over the performance of Brazilian companies and 
institutions in the country, especially with regards to ProSavana project, led different 
sectors of the Mozambican society to distrust Brazilian initiatives. In Mozambique, social 
segments, rural population, small farmers and the population that live in the areas 
affected by the mega-projects have resisted such initiatives over accusations of land 
grabbing and disregard for local communities (Nogueira et al, 2017:244). In fact, Brazil’s 
initiatives in the Nacala Corridor within the context of ProSavana were called a “Trojan 
horse of Brazilian economic interest” by certain quarters of the Mozambican civil society 
(Chichava et al, 2013 cited Bry, 2017a:24). 
 Additionally, in the context of the outcomes of Operation Car Wash, the presence 
of Brazilian companies in Mozambique was challenged by revelations of corruption, as 
well as the temporary cancellation of incentives for internationalisation by the BNDES. 




the case with Brazilian construction companies Andrade Gutierrez and Odebrecht – 
bribery with Mozambican officials of illegal benefits (Chichava, 2017:389).  
 All in all, Brazilian foreign policy under Rousseff presented some level of 
continuity when it came to the relationship with key partners such as Mozambique. This 
continuity, however, was not deprived of significant changes in the narrative and actions 
of the Brazilian government towards SSDC in Mozambique. The pursuit of mutual 
economic gains were emphasised over the inauguration of new development 
cooperation projects. Under Temer, the significant changes in the domestic setting – 
towards a more neoliberal approach – reflected in the relationship with the country 
through the cancellation of cooperation projects and the search for the payment of loans, 
which is in sharp contrast with Lula and Rousseff’s debt relief agenda.  
 Moreover, though efforts to expand the presence of Brazilian businesses in 
Mozambique intensified under both administrations in question, accusations of 
corruption in the context of Car-Wash and contestations over key Brazilian cooperation 
projects by the Mozambican society have furthered weakened the relationship between 
the two countries. 
 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
  Although Mozambique remains one of Brazil’s major development partners in 
Africa, with ongoing projects like ProSavana, the approach towards the country moved 
from one of solidarity-based cooperation to one of sole economic pragmatism. It is then 
appropriate to say that, by 2018, Brazil had “pulled the plug” on development cooperation 
in Mozambique, or at least the state-led model developed under Lula. This, however, 
happened gradually over the administrations of Rousseff and Temer, led by the 
economic recession (and the austere response by the Rousseff and the Temer 
governments); and the political crisis that began after major street demonstrations 
against the austerity measures adopted by Rousseff, intensified by the revelation of 
Operation Car Wash and the impeachment. 
Faced with limited budget, Brazil began to adopt initiatives that could provide 
short-term economic gains over the more complex, long-term objectives drafted under 
Lula. The quest for economic returns from the relationship with the African continent 
dominated parliamentary meetings, as shown previously. More than just a rational claim, 
this also reflected the politicisation of South-South Development Cooperation and 
Brazil’s agenda towards Africa. With its credibility destroyed by the revelations of 
Operation Car Wash, the Workers’ Party (PT) lost most of its public approval, and so did 
the international development agenda driven the party. In other words, the “Lula agenda” 




and politicians alike, intensified by the “default” of some African partners who received 
resources from the Brazilian government, such as Mozambique.  
Under Lula, besides being a major economic partner, Mozambique was also 
considered an important ally to support Brazil in its international agenda of reforming 
international financial institutions. Acquiring a permanent seat at the UN Security Council 
and establishing itself as a leader of the Global South were ambitions pursued through 
SSDC. In this sense, Brazil’s SSDC agenda also carried political intensions, i.e. to gain 
legitimacy among global South countries and thus garner developing countries’ solidarity 
in its quest for global prominence. As of the rise of Temer to the presidential office, 
following the parliamentary coup inspired by anti-PT sentiments, the Brazilian 
government reshaped its foreign policy goals, distancing itself from initiatives associated 
with the Lula government. Therefore, the political foundations of Brazil’s relationship with 
Mozambique were put aside over economic ones. 
Under Rousseff, Brazil started to adopt a more commercial tone to its SSDC 
agenda. Though it completed important SSDC projects that had been negotiated under 
Lula and even started others, the intensity was much lower. Most importantly, the SSDC 
agenda towards Africa and Mozambique, in particular, was provided with an economic 
nature that, although existent, was not emphasised under Lula’s administrations.  
During Temer’s government, the narrative towards Africa highlighted the need for 
mutual economic gains and the return of the investments carried out in the previous 
governments. Furthermore, under Temer, the government sought to rid the foreign policy 
agenda of the political ideologies that used to drive the pursuit of alliances with the Global 
South and the reform of the international system. The consequences for SSDC were not 
totally destructive, but helped to reframe the foundations and objectives of this agenda. 
As for Brazil-Mozambique relations, in the context of SSDC, the contestations 
around the social consequences of ProSavana and the corruption scandals involving 
Brazilian enterprises and Mozambican government officials helped further damage the 
credibility of Brazilian initiatives in the country, dealing a heavy blow to the two countries’ 
once strong relationship. While it can be argued that Brazilian foreign policy disposition 
changed gradually under Rousseff, under Temer the changes were far more significant, 
expressed in his desire to realign Brazil with its traditional partners from the North to the 
detriment of South-South relations. In other words, while the Rousseff government 
exhibited features of continuation, yet with less intensity, under Temer Brazil pulled the 






Chapter V: Conclusion 
The quest for development in the disadvantaged regions of the world intensified 
after the Second World War, when the wave of decolonisation swept across most of 
Africa and Asia. The marginalisation of these economies within the international 
architecture of power and their economic and political dependence to the industrialised 
North gave birth to a series of movements for autonomy, independence and the right to 
development. From Bandung to Buenos Aires and beyond, such political movements 
questioned the traditional Northern model of development aid. The unfair nature of this 
kind of aid is best illustrated by the fact that assistance is usually attached to 
conditionalities of economic nature (“tied aid”) and frequently motivated by the donors’ 
political interests. 
The demand was high for alternative models of development to those generally 
imposed by Western powers, and South-South Development Cooperation (SSC) 
emerges as an attempt to fulfil said aspirations. SSDC rejected DAC-related practices 
and embodied the principles of horizontality and reciprocity. Unlike North-South 
cooperation, SSDC did not entail an empathetic transmission of “superior” practices to 
those who need them, but the sharing of experiences that seek to tackle similar concerns 
(provision of basic needs, health, education, hunger and poverty eradication, and so 
forth).  It also entailed respect for national sovereignty and for the specificities of the 
national context of those countries that receive assistance. However, it was not until the 
turn of the century that the rise of key Southern players, such as Brazil, would diversify 
and challenge the global development landscape. 
The beginning of the new millennium was accompanied by a series of significant 
changes to the existing international political and economic architecture, especially with 
regards to development cooperation. The "rise of the South" reshuffled the global 
structures of power. Economic growth and integration into the world's production chains 
provided countries such as China, India and Brazil a stronger political voice. While China 
challenged the domination of the neoliberal international order, countries like Brazil 
sought to revive their demands for reform, i.e. a more democratic global architecture was 
vital for the development of Southern countries. 
Against this backdrop, Brazil stood out, in the first decade of the millennium, as 
a key development partner and a legitimate voice of the South. Under Lula’s 
administrations, Brazil raised its international profile by exporting, through SSDC, 
successful domestic policies aimed at fostering economic development and social 
inclusion. As for Africa, for example, the Kenyan Harvard professor Calestous Juma’s 
well-known saying “for every African problem there is a Brazilian solution” illustrates 




This positive image, however, is not only consequence of Brazil’s “assertive” 
foreign policy towards South-South relations. Neither is it the sole result of Lula’s 
presidential diplomacy, exercised through constant visits to the African continent, for 
instance. Whereas all these factors did play a role, it was Brazil’s remarkable levels of 
development in the first decade of the century that sparked the interest of African 
countries. Enabled by the country’s impressive economic growth, the Lula government 
put in place distributive policies that lifted millions of Brazilians out of poverty, coupled 
with social programmes aimed at fighting hunger, racial inequality and extreme poverty. 
In short, Brazil became the “successful model to be emulated”, a status that laid the 
foundations of the country’s international ambitions and its South-South Development 
Cooperation agenda. 
However, this upward trajectory was thwarted after 2011 when the global financial 
crisis eventually hit the Brazilian economy and other developing countries, thus 
rearranging, once more, the distribution of global economic power. Beyond that, the loss 
of economic weight led to the weakening of political power once wielded by the Global 
South, and consequently their reformist agenda. For Brazil, the financial crisis brought 
an end to the cycle of economic prosperity and ascendance experienced under the Lula 
government, severely affecting its South-South Cooperation agenda, particularly with the 
African continent. 
 In this context, this paper’s main objective was to understand how changes28 in 
Brazil’s broader international agenda affected the country’s South-South relations under 
the governments of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and Michel Temer (2016-2018), 
especially with regards to Brazil’s development cooperation agenda in Africa. Contrary 
to South America (Brazil’s immediate neighbours, where questions of security and 
regional dominance need to be attended to), Africa is not an immediate priority for 
Brazil’s foreign policy. For this reason, Brazil’s stance towards the continent is constantly 
revised, being directly tied to the perceptions and motivations of political leaders. Though 
Brazil enjoys relationships with several other African countries, this paper set out to 
analyse the individual case of Brazil-Mozambique relations, specifically within the realm 
of SSDC.  
The main finding of this paper is that, while the Lula government laid the 
foundations of Brazil’s South-South Development Cooperation agenda (i.e. an 
instrument for the pursuit of the country’s global ambitions and a reflection of the national 
approach to development), these foundations were undermined during the subsequent 
governments, led by constraining international circumstances and the dismantling of the 
 
28 When using the term “changes”, this paper reflects back to the Lula government, where both 




state-led developmental model advanced by the Workers’ Party. The jettisoning of SSDC 
initiatives was a consequence of two main mechanisms, (a) changes in Brazil’s foreign 
policy disposition which was driven more by an economist outlook than merely the 
promotion South-South interests, and (b) the re-orientation of the national development 
project characterised by its in-ward looking approach which prioritised, first and foremost, 
domestic economic interests. 
With regards to the first mechanism, this paper contends that foreign policy goals 
were re-defined in economic terms, and the same applied to SSDC. The political goals 
that underpinned Brazil’s reformist ambitions lost space once the latter were gradually 
abandoned under Rousseff and completely discarded under Temer.  
Under Lula, the desire to expand Brazil’s alliances within the South and achieve 
a leadership position was motivated by the demand for the democratisation of the 
international system, i.e. the United Nations Security Council (in which Brazil’s 
aspirations for a seat gained momentum during the Lula government) and the World 
Trade Organisation, most prominently. Reform was seen, by Lula’s progressive 
government, as the only way for marginalised countries to achieve sustainable economic 
development. Conversely, Brazil could only lead the pro-reform agenda with the support 
of other developing countries. Strong political ties with the South were mostly cultivated 
through Lula’s diplomacy and SSDC initiatives. 
 Coming from the same political party as Lula, Rousseff carried these reformist 
ambitions through her two terms, however with less enthusiasm and not so assertively. 
The reasons for that lie in the re-arrangement of economic and political power after the 
Global South was hit by the global financial crisis, mentioned earlier. Furthermore, the 
political crisis installed inside the Rousseff government (i.e. corruption scandals, loss of 
political support) drew the President’s attention to domestic issues and led to a decrease 
in efforts towards foreign affairs. This rollback was intensified under the Temer 
government, now motivated by the re-configuration in Brazil’s international politics. 
Holding a more conservative understanding of global politics, Temer’s Brazil sought to 
redirect the country’s foreign policy by realigning with the “traditional partners” of the 
North, i.e. the USA and the European Union. Notwithstanding political ideologies, Temer 
was motivated by the need for the country to “regain” credibility in the eyes of the 
international community and attract the necessary investments for economic recovery. 
This reorientation resulted in an obvious detachment from the reformist ambitions of the 
progressive Workers’ Party, relegating South-South relations and the SSDC agenda to 





Moreover, faced with the economic constraints imposed by the global financial 
crisis, “economics” returned to the centre of Brazil’s international agenda. The need to 
reverse the downward trajectory of the Brazilian economy reflected in the country’s 
foreign policy. Africa, as in other periods of Brazilian history, lost once more the status 
of Brazil’s strategic development partner. In this context, investment agreements and 
policies to expand international trade outpaced cooperation for development. 
Accordingly, state-led development (both domestically and in the country’s international 
approach) gave way to the interests of private capital. As a result, South-South 
Development Cooperation as seen during the Lula government was not officially 
abandoned, but redefined in terms of mutual economic gains. In Africa, the solidarity 
and altruistic narrative that accompanied Brazil’s SSDC practices and helped legitimise 
them diminished, and a more pragmatic tone was adopted. 
Though the points presented summarise the major changes observed in Brazil’s 
foreign policy under Rousseff and Temer, it does not provide a full account of the 
country’s rollback in South-South Development Cooperation agenda towards Africa. On 
the contrary, while the global circumstances discussed above aided in limiting the reach 
of Brazil’s SSDC during said period, it did not define the outlook of this agenda. In this 
point, the adequacy of the theoretical point of departure adopted in this study is once 
more evidenced. Paraphrasing Rose (1998), the influence of systemic factors may have 
limited Brazil’s “menu of foreign policy choices” for the Rousseff and Temer 
governments, but it did not dictate “the selection of one particular item on that menu 
over another”. In other words, Brazil faced clear limitations for the expansion of its 
cooperation agenda in Africa, but these were merely constraints, not determinants. The 
nuances behind the re-formulation of Brazil’s foreign policy with regards to SSDC in 
Africa are mostly found within Brazil’s internal setting, i.e. the president’s diplomatic 
style, the standing of the ruling coalition, the relationship with non-domestic actors and, 
most importantly, the model of national development and its accomplishments. 
As previously discussed in this paper, domestic politics played a significant role 
in both the rise and the fall of Brazil’s development cooperation agenda for Africa. 
Bearing this in mind, the second mechanism through which the foundations of Brazil’s 
SSDC agenda were undermined can be summarized as follows: South-South 
Development Cooperation both reflected and fed the model of state-led development 
adopted by the Lula government. Once this model was delegitimised and eventually 
dismantled, the SSDC agenda lost its impetus. 
Under Lula, national development dominated both national and international 
policies. Inspired by the progressive ideas of his political party, which he helped found, 




as the key distributor and provider of economic resources. As discussed in this thesis, 
the Lula government introduced a series of economic and social policies aimed to fight 
hunger, eradicate HIV, increase social protection and minimum wage, among others. 
Commended by the international community, several of these policies attracted the 
interest of developing countries that faced similar predicaments, particularly in Africa.   
Via SSDC, mostly financed by the Brazilian government, Brazil shared 
experiences and exported successful stories of development. As a result, the prominent 
role of the Brazilian state in SSDC allowed for a narrative of altruism without private 
economic interests. This, however, became unsustainable once the state lost its 
financing capacity. The economic recession led the governments of Rousseff and Temer 
to pursue austere policies, consequently affecting development cooperation practices. 
This was illustrated by the cuts in the ABC’s budget that started in the first years of 
Rousseff’s government. Under tighter budgetary capacity, Brazil reduced promotion of 
SSDC and emphasised the need to establish economically-beneficial partnerships that 
could aid the recovery of the Brazilian economy. This trend was both intensified and 
extrapolated under Temer, where the demands for “return” of the investments made in 
Africa evolved to the condemnation of partner countries that were unable to pay back 
the Brazilian government.  
Furthermore, the “SSDC in Africa” agenda was largely personified in the image 
of Lula and his political party, the PT. Lula’s personal engagement with Brazil’s 
international agenda along with his own history of poverty and hunger provided Brazil 
with important credentials to develop its cooperation activities, particularly in Africa. 
Though very positive, the imaginary of a “Lula Agenda”, as opposed to a Brazilian one, 
carried significant consequences for the subsequent governments. With the onset of 
Operation Car Wash, allegations of corruption involving PT officials, coupled with the 
dire consequences of the economic recession for the Brazilian people led to diminishing 
support for the Rousseff government. Street demonstrations clamouring for Rousseff’s 
impeachment were clear manifestations of the dismantling of the Workers’ Party’s 
government. 
After losing the support of the Brazilian public, its government coalition and 
Brazilian private sector alike, Rousseff’s government crumbled. These difficulties, 
coupled with the President’s dull presidential diplomacy helped to undermine Brazil’s 
international presence. The impeachment of Rousseff was conveniently supported by 
her vice-president Michel Temer, who ascended to power in 2016. Building upon this 
anti-PT sentiments and the demands of the street protests, Temer had to represent “a 
new era” for Brazil’s national and international agenda. As for Brazil’s foreign policy, 




back’ the country’s credibility internationally, particularly countries in the North. Deemed 
by conservatives as “extremely ideological” (given the reformist nature), the Workers’ 
Party’s foreign policy had to be replaced with a “non-ideological” and pragmatic one.  
Brazil’s SSDC agenda was mistakenly taken as representing the sole interests of the 
governments of PT, though doomed to failure. Temer’s request to officially join the OECD 
illustrates that the pro-reform project was discarded, opening a new chapter in Brazil’s 
foreign policy and its relations with the African continent, in particular Mozambique. 
It is important to reiterate the two mains reasons behind the choice for 
Mozambique over other African countries. Firstly and most obviously, this lusophone 
country is considered to be Africa’s largest recipient of Brazil’s development cooperation 
initiatives in the twenty-first century. It hosts, for instance, the ProSavana, Brazil’s largest 
cooperation project in the continent. Secondly, for decades Mozambique has been an 
attractive destination for foreign direct investments from Brazil, having hosted some of 
Brazil’s major “national champions” such as Vale. Analysing the interplay between state-
funded SSDC and the internationalisation of Brazilian private capital is of utmost 
importance to understand the significant changes experienced under Rousseff and 
Temer. It also displays an important feature of Brazil’s cooperation initiatives in Africa.  
The factors driving Brazil-Mozambique relations before and after Lula were 
adequately identified and analysed through the lens of the theoretical framework adopted 
in this study, namely neoclassical realism.  As a theory of foreign policy that draws upon 
realist assumptions about the international system, neoclassical realism offered a 
broader understanding to the Brazilian case than neorealism would have, for instance. 
Any attempt to analyse this individual case taking into account uniquely systemic factors 
would have resulted in an incomplete account. This is demonstrated by the unique set 
of circumstances inherent in Brazilian politics that shaped and re-shaped the country’s 
development cooperation agenda in Mozambique, as will be outlined later. 
Notwithstanding the particularities of Brazil’s relationship with each of its African 
partners, Mozambique once more epitomises the determinants of Brazil’s approach to 
Africa through South-South Development Cooperation. Mozambique is a clear 
manifestation of the rationale behind Brazil’s SSDC agenda and exposes its fragility. 
More than that, this case illustrates of the two major foundations of Brazil’s SSDC, i.e. 
a reflection of the national approach to development, formulated within the domestic 
political environment. 
As for Brazil’s SSDC cooperation Mozambique after Lula, shifts in this approach 
manifested in different ways. The ProSavana experienced lack of resources that 
compromised the implementation of the project, a problem that was only counter-




Rousseff government initiated new projects in the country, the Brazil-Mozambique 
Cooperation and Investment Facilitation Agreement (CIFA) signed in 2015 – an 
important realisation for Brazil-Mozambique relations – illustrates the economic 
diplomacy towards the country that resurges after 2011. More than that, it reflects the 
national model of development in place, in which the state gives way to private capital in 
order to restore its finances. Furthermore, even though there is little quantitative 
information about SSDC under the Temer government, his standing towards 
Mozambique is best illustrated by the cancellation of major cooperation projects and the 
condemnation of Mozambique’s “default”, largely covered by the media and used by 
conservative politicians to delegitimise the “Lula agenda” of cooperation for 
development. 
Not least important, Operation Car Wash exposed illegal practices involving 
Brazilian companies and Mozambican officials. This, coupled with contestations over the 
activities of ProSavana, helped undermine the credibility of Brazilian projects in the 
country. It is also worth pointing out that the Temer government charted a new era for 
the political relationship between Brazil and Mozambique, given the fact that the affinity 
between the PT and the Mozambican ruling party Frelimo also facilitated cooperation 
between the two countries29. 
 
5.1. Considerations for future research 
 Needless to say, this research does not exhaust all the complexities of Brazil-
Mozambique relations, not even within the realm of development cooperation alone. As 
an analysis of foreign policy and foreign policy disposition, this paper focused on the 
determinants of development cooperation agenda rather than the results or impact of 
such activities. Though it can be concluded that foreign policy changes did impact on 
Brazil’s South-South Cooperation with Mozambique, future field research could further 
analyse the results of such cooperation for the African country’s actual development. 
Furthermore, though touched upon in this paper, the interplay between national 
development and South-South Development Cooperation – how exactly do they feed 
each other, other than the fact that both are governmental projects? Furthermore, the 
impact of Mozambican and Brazilian civil society on the formulation of the SSDC agenda 
could also be further researched, especially given the controversies of projects such as 
ProSavana.
 
29 See UOL (2016). Afinidade política favorece relações de Brasil e Moçambique. Últimas 
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